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Legislating a minimum age of marriage at 18 has stirred countermobilization in some, but not all, countries where religious or traditional institutions enjoy constitutional authority. Why does counter-mobilization arise in some cases but not in others? This brief shows how differently child marriage reform processes play out in traditional-majority and Muslim-majority states. We argue that variation in the nature of family law, specifically whether it is codified or living, explains the presence or absence of counter-mobilization. The findings from this study have implications for anti-child marriage advocates across the developing world, and may inform the design and strategy taken by international agencies, national governments, and civil society organizations pressing for legal reform.

The Islamist state in Sudan, which came to power through a coup d'etat in 1989 under the command of Omar al-Bashir, has constitutionally guaranteed women's equal right to work (and to equal pay). However, several laws codified by the Islamist government put restrictions on women's right to work. As a result, Sudan is considered among the "worst" countries when it comes to restrictive legal contexts for women's economic empowerment (e.g., see Mala Htun, Francesca Refsum Jensenius and Jamie Nelson Nunez, this volume).The most severe legal restriction identified in this study is the Muslim Family Law of 1991, which requires wives to get the approval of their husbands before working for wages outside of the matrimonial home. Sudan is one of 18 countries in the world where women need permission from a male guardian to work for a wage. By law, men are the sole financial providers within the family, and women are the sole caregivers within the family. If a woman can get permission to work, however, she can spend the money she earns as she wishes and is under no obligation to spend her wage to alleviate the man's financial duty to provide financially for the family. As such, there is an interesting tension in the law: while the permission to enter the workplace is, in reality, a privilege bestowed by husbands rather than a constitutional right granted by the state, the Sudanese interpretation of Islamic law regarding the wife's control of her own income presents a potential avenue for women's economic agency and empowerment.As part of the special issue on Legal Change and Women's Economic Empowerment, I explore barriers to as well as possibilities for women's economic agency and empowerment within the legally restrictive context of the Islamist state in Sudan. Building on interviews with