China’s political system has continued to maintain a highly centralized regime despite embracing a decentralized development strategy after the 1979 economic reform. The central government frequently makes changes in political leadership to control regional governments. Such political turnover in the regional governments can generate substantial political uncertainty, which affects the overall management direction and environment of Chinese public enterprises. This study analyzes the impact of replacing city-level party secretaries (CPS) on corporate investment in 228 municipal cities in China. Political appointees can replace city-level party secretaries from within and outside the city or from higher levels of the government. Our empirical results show that these kinds of replacements more significantly dampened investment activities in listed private companies than in companies in which the city-level party secretaries have retained their positions. Corporate investment activities decreased more when a city-level party secretary was replaced with a person outside the city or parachuted from central government than when replaced within the city. Moreover, replacement effects were more negative for privatized state-owned enterprises (SOEs) than for the original privately owned companies.

While China has been experiencing rapid economic growth, its conflicts with the United States have become more public. In particular, the argument that the Chinese government can easily gain public support in establishing and promoting national policies under its authoritarian regime has been on the rise. With this background, this study conducts an empirical analysis of data from 4,366 survey respondents using ordinary least squares and ordered logit models to analyze the effect of the Chinese government’s political propaganda and individual characteristics on anti-US sentiment. The results suggest that this propaganda strengthens anti-US sentiment. As for individual characteristics, party officials have stronger anti-US sentiment. Moreover, interacting exposure to political propaganda with the main variables suggests that members of the Communist Party of China, national minorities, and rural residents have stronger anti-US sentiment, presumably because they are more influenced by political propaganda.

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There has been a debate on how the state-driven anticorruption movement during the Xi Jinping administration has influenced state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Research has examined the relationship between corruption and economic development at the country level in Asia and has found paradoxically that economic growth and high corruption levels can coexist. However, the “Asian paradox” that appears at the country level may be a transitional phenomenon of the short term. Not many researchers have empirically compared individual firm-level performance before and after a strong anticorruption drive, drawing on relevant comparison groups. This study tests whether Xi’s 2012 anticorruption campaign improved SOEs’ performance. With a difference-in-differences method, it explores whether the anticorruption campaign had different effects on the financial performance of SOEs and non-SOEs (private companies). We find that the anticorruption initiative improved SOEs’ financial performance and benefited SOEs more than non-SOEs.