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Relevant results from long lasting work on C(I)IP will be tangibleWith the tenth ECN issue the articles move from awareness to case studies, results of C(I)IP research and conceptual innovations. C(I)IP is now discussed for years at policy and conceptual levels. The policy actors have completed fundamental studies and start to take action. About this IssueAndrea Servida highlights the background on which an EU policy initiative on Critical Communication and Information Infrastructure Protection (C(I)IP) may grow and gives inside into the action points of this initiative. Two articles on the Integrated Risk Reduction of Information-based Infrastructure Systems "IRRIIS" project follow:• An overview on IRRIIS is given, pointing out the SimCIP simulation and the four components of the middleware improved technology MIT.• Functional principle of MIT middleware improved technology and its four main component give insights on the tool.The EUropean Risk Assessment Methodology project EURAM integrates with the same yardstick risk assessment form corporate level up up to European level. The elaborated results are presented and an outlook for the successor project EURACOM is given. A report on The First Dutch Process Control Security Event is given by EricLuiijf pointing out the strong need for actions in securing PCS. Three general recommendation discussed during the Event are disclosed to the reader.The Royal Academy of Engineering published its report Dilemmas of Privacy and Surveillance in March 2007. In spite of all securing measures this report demonstrates how to consider urgent demands of our privacy.Today's risks to the financial sector discloses that "Financial Industry Sector" lost its e-innocence: New e-risk factors have appeared. As a result, the financial sector has to deal with e-espionage, identity theft and the problems of international terrorism. Cyber Security Assessment of a PowerPlant analyses in a true corporate environment the risk of attacking the power process control environment. The results are presented in text and graphs. , will be to enhance the level of CIIP preparedness and response across the European Union. To achieve this aim, the initiative will build on national and private sector activities and will involve relevant public and private stakeholders in ensuring that adequate and consistent levels of preventive, detection, emergency and recovery measures are put into operation to ensure a high level of security and resilience of critical communication and information infrastructures as well as to guarantee the continuity of services. Governance and Risk Management in a globally integrated Ecosystem The preparatory stepsTo prepare the initiative on CIIP, the Directorate General Information Society and Media of the European Commission has launched a number of studies and consultations.The first study was launched in 2006 to assess the on availability and reliability of electronic communication infrastructures. The study, which is called ARECI and was carried out by Alcatel-Lucent, has iden...

A global vulnerability is a set of vulnerabilities in one or several nodes of an ICT infrastructure. These vulnerabilities enable some attacks that may be sequentialized so that the privileges that each attack requires are acquired through the previous ones. Current vulnerability scanners cannot discover global vulnerabilities because they analyze each node in isolation, without correlating the vulnerabilities in the same or in distinct nodes. To discover global vulnerabilities, an analysis has to correlate node vulnerabilities according to the architecture and the topology of the infrastructure. After defining a formal analysis to discover global vulnerabilities and the corresponding attack sequences, we present GVScan, a tool to automate the analysis based upon a classification of vulnerabilities. A first application of GVScan to a real infrastructure is described together with an evaluation of its accuracy. I. INTRODUCTIONTo evaluate the security of an ICT infrastructure, we need to discover all its vulnerabilities and the attacks they enable. Currently, this analysis is supported by several tools that scan, e.g. analyze, a node to discover its local vulnerabilities and the elementary attacks they enable. However, these tools may miss some attacks because they do not correlate the vulnerabilities of distinct infrastructure nodes. Hence, they neglect that an intelligent threat agent may discover and implement a complex attack, e.g. a sequence of elementary attacks enabled by distinct local vulnerabilities in one or several nodes. A complex attack results in a privilege escalation where an agent uses the privileges acquired through an attack in the sequence to implement the following ones till acquiring all the privileges of interest. By properly exploiting interactions among nodes, an agent that owns some privileges on a node can implement a complex attack to acquire further privileges on a distinct node. A complex attack is enabled by a global vulnerability, i.e. by a set of local correlated vulnerabilities. Each distinct elementary attack in the complex one is enabled by a subset of the vulnerabilities in the global one. This paper presents a formal analysis to correlate local, distinct vulnerabilities in one or several nodes based upon a formal classification of vulnerabilities. Then, it describes GVScan, the tool that automates this analysis to discover global vulnerabilities of an ICT infrastructure starting from the output of the scanning of each node. The paper is organized as follows. Sect. 2 briefly

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