Abstract. Social identity theory, intergroup emotions theory (IET), and related approaches offer the potential to understand the social psychological aspects of collective behavior such as movements that protest against or argue for war. Social identification, however, tends to be a weak predictor of collective action intentions. We argue that in order to understand the fault lines of collective action it is useful to consider identification with opinion-based groups. We illustrate this in relation to support for and opposition to the war on terror (WoT) in Australia. Comparing predictions based on IET with those based on opinion-based group identification, we found limited support for the sets of connections hypothesized by IET. Alternatively, social identification with pro- and anti-WoT opinion-based groups was a strong predictor of different emotional reactions and associated action intentions. In particular, highly identified supporters of the WoT were angry at terrorists, and this anger in turn predicted offensive action tendencies against the terrorists. Stronger yet were the emotional reactions of anger at the government reported by highly identified opponents of the WoT, which strongly predicted anti-war protest action intentions. The results point to the utility of the opinion-based group concept for understanding the collective, yet contested, aspects of political support for war and peace in contemporary society.

for the presence of statements promoting fearconsistent appraisals . Fear-arousing content was present in 24 of these speeches, but the amount of fear-arousing content varied markedly. In particular, rhetoric that raised doubts about the capacity of Australia and its allies to cope with terrorism was most strongly present in the lead-up to the invasion of Iraq and at times of declining support for government policies. Textual analysis of three key speeches confirmed a marked difference between Howard's speech given immediately after the attacks on September 11, 2001, and the second and third speeches presented prior to and after the 2003 invasion of Iraq. These findings indicate that Howard has not consistently employed fear-inducing rhetoric in his speeches about terrorism, but that particular speeches appear to take this form, raising the possibility that fear-arousing rhetoric may have been selectively deployed to support his political purposes at those times.In the proclaimed "new age" of terrorism-related dangers and concerns, political leaders have increasingly been criticized for manipulating public fears of terrorism to achieve specific political objectives (Altheide, 2003;Furedi,

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