The objective of this paper is to analyze the effects of the quality of institutions on the economic diversification of the countries of the Economic and Monetary Community of Central African States (CEMAC). The panel data used cover the period 1995-2019 and are extracted from the UNCTAD, WGI and WDI databases of the World Bank. The econometric analysis of the panel data, using the Pooled Mean Group (PMG) technique, shows that two variables are significant in the short term: corruption control for Congo and political stability for Equatorial Guinea. In the long term, corruption control has a positive impact on economic diversification, while political stability has a negative effect on economic diversification. The results imply that 1) the leaders of CEMAC countries should ensure political stability by adding a measure of good governance to improve economic diversification, and 2) through the fight against corruption, the public authorities should adopt rational frameworks that enable them to effectively strengthen economic diversification.

This study aims to answer the question of whether investments have an effect on the economic diversification of the countries of the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMAC). The panel data used cover the period 1995-2019 and are extracted from the UNCTAD, WGI and WDI databases of the World Bank. To address the research question, we used panel data econometrics. The results obtained show that private investment improves economic diversification, while public investment hinders economic diversification in the CEMAC. These results imply 1) the need to enhance the attractiveness of private investment in all sectors of the economy and 2) the importance of improving state governance through a shift from the rentier to the developmental state.

L’asymétrie de l’information dans les contrats de partage de la rente pétrolière nous amène à nous interroger sur la stabilité dans le temps de l’équilibre contractuel entre le Congo et les compagnies pétrolières internationales. Deux types de contrats de partage de la rente pétrolière sont formalisés pour inciter le Congo par sélection adverse, d’en choisir un en fonction des fluctuations du prix du baril de pétrole. Quand le prix du baril de pétrole est inférieur à 15$, le contrat de concession est privilégié, au-delà jusqu’à 35$, le contrat de partage de production est choisi. Le régime actuel est celui de partage de production avec un équilibre de Nash en stratégies dominantes, pures et de duel, qui serait instable à cause des menaces crédibles des risques liés à l’aléa moral des compagnies pétrolières, du cost-oil, aux fluctuations des cours mondiaux, des préfinancements pétroliers, de l’incontestabilité des marchés pétroliers, de la mauvaise formalisation du partage, de la malédiction des ressources naturelles, qui aggravent l’asymétrie de l’information et la vulnérabilité du Congo qui connait des graves crises socio-économique et financière.

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This research focuses on the relationship between structural change and economic development. Its objective is to examine how shocks to production structures affect economic development in Cameroon and Congo. To achieve this objective, we apply the SVAR methodology by mobilizing the World Bank database over the period 1975 to 2017. The results of the estimates indicate that in the long term, for both CEMAC countries, the service sector has a positive effect on economic development, while the agricultural and industrial sectors have a negative impact on economic development. The main lesson learned from this work is that CEMAC authorities should promote, at the subregional level, policies to facilitate and further develop services, including through public-private partnerships (PPPs).