No abstract

No abstract

As today, vehicles are equipped with wireless sensors and on-board computers capable of collecting and processing a large amount of data; they can communicate to each other via different communication types and through different relay nodes. Internet of Vehicles (IoV) routing protocols are deployed to monitor these communications with various strategies to achieve a high availability of communication. In this paper, we propose to extend an existing taxonomy representing the necessary criteria to build IoV routing algorithms, by adding two new important criteria: security aspect and network architecture. Enhanced vehicular routing protocols with different security mechanisms have been studied, compared, and classified with respect to the authentication, the integrity, the confidentiality, the nonrepudiation, and the availability of data and communications. Routing protocols using the software-defined networking (SDN) paradigm have also been reviewed in order to compare with those with traditional network architectures. Three types of SDN routing protocols, namely, centralized, decentralized, and hybrid control planes, have been analyzed. This survey will be useful for the choice of IoV routing protocols that take into account the flexibility, the scalability, and the intelligence of vehicular networks, as well as the security mechanisms against cyberattacks while being cost aware.

Localization is an important topic in mobile wireless ad hoc and sensor networks, which has received considerable attention from the research community during the past few decades. In many sensor networks applications, location awareness is useful or even necessary. However, because of their key role in wireless sensor networks, localization systems can be the target of an attack that could compromise the entire functioning of a wireless sensor network. In this paper, we present a novel defense mechanism against wormhole attacks in DV‐Hop localization algorithm. The main idea of our approach is to plug in a proactive countermeasure to the basic DV‐Hop scheme called Infection prevention. We choose the wormhole attack as our defending target because it is a particularly challenging attack that can be successfully launched without compromising any nodes or having access to any cryptographic keys. Using analysis and simulation, we show that our solution is effective in detecting and defending against wormhole attacks with a high detection rate. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

No abstract