We implement a meta-regression-analysis for the budgetary impact of numerical fiscal rules based on 30 studies published in the last decade. The existing empirical evidence points to a constraining effect of rules on fiscal aggregates. However, this seemingly optimistic message is strongly weakened as our analysis points to a bias if the potential endogeneity of fiscal rules is not explicitly taken into account. Furthermore, our analysis provides evidence for the presence of a publication bias. Both sources of bias reduce the statistical precision of obtained effects below usual levels of statistical significance. In addition, we offer suggestive evidence for the effect size based on a small coherent sub-sample and provide recommendations for future research on the budgetary impact of fiscal rules.

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Die Dis cus si on Pape rs die nen einer mög lichst schnel len Ver brei tung von neue ren For schungs arbei ten des ZEW. Die Bei trä ge lie gen in allei ni ger Ver ant wor tung der Auto ren und stel len nicht not wen di ger wei se die Mei nung des ZEW dar.Dis cus si on Papers are inten ded to make results of ZEW research prompt ly avai la ble to other eco no mists in order to encou ra ge dis cus si on and sug gesti ons for revi si ons. The aut hors are sole ly respon si ble for the con tents which do not neces sa ri ly repre sent the opi ni on of the ZEW. Do Fiscal Rules Constrain Fiscal Policy? A Meta-Regression-Analysis AbstractWe implement a meta-regression-analysis for the budgetary impact of numerical fiscal rules. Based on 30 studies published in the last decade, we offer a consensus estimate with respect to the level of statistical significance, provide suggestive evidence for the effect size, and identify study features of relevance for the measured impact of fiscal rules. Overall, the results document a constraining impact of rules. However, this impact is weakened if refined identification strategies are employed. Moreover, the results provide evidence for a publication bias in which journals are more likely to report constraining and statistically significant effects compared to working papers. We further provide recommendations for future research on the budgetary impact of fiscal rules.

We investigate the political determinants of risk premiums which sub-national governments in Switzerland have to pay for their sovereign bond emissions. For this purpose we analyse financial market data from 288 tradable cantonal bonds in the period from 1981 to 2007. Our main focus is on two different institutional factors. First, many of the Swiss cantons have adopted strong fiscal rules. We find evidence that both the presence and the strength of these fiscal rules contribute significantly to lower cantonal bond spreads. Second, we study the impact of a credible no-bailout regime on the risk premia of potential guarantors. We make use of the Leukerbad court decision in July 2003 which relieved the cantons from backing municipalities in financial distress, thus leading to a fully credible no-bailout regime. Our results show that this break lead to a reduction of cantonal risk premia by about 25 basis points. Moreover, it cut the link between cantonal risk premia and the financial situation of the municipalities in its canton which existed before. This demonstrates that a not fully credible no-bailout commitment can entail high costs for the potential guarantor. JEL Codes: E62, G12, H63, H74