No abstract

This paper presents a game-theoretic model of a liberalized railway market, in which train operation and ownership of infrastructure are vertically separated. We analyze how the regulatory agency will optimally set the charges that operators have to pay to the infrastructure manager for access to the tracks and how these charges change with increased competition in the railway market. Our analysis shows that an increased number of competitors in the freight and/or passenger segment reduces prices per kilometer and increases total output in train kilometers. The regulatory agency reacts to more competition with a reduction in access charges in the corresponding segment. Consumers bene…t through lower prices, while individual pro…ts of each operator decrease through a higher number of competitors. We further show that the welfare e¤ect of increased competition in the freight and/or passenger segment is ambiguous and depends on the level of competition. Finally, social welfare is higher under two-part tari¤s than under one-part tari¤s if raising public funds is costly to society.

Conçu pour les enseignant-es qui, intervenant dans l’enseignement supérieur ou dans la formation d’adultes, souhaitent élaborer de nouveaux enseignements ou en revisiter d’anciens, cet ouvrage propose une approche pratique, visuelle et modulaire fondée sur le principe de la cohérence pédagogique, et articulée autour d’un canevas intégrant les principales dimensions d’un enseignement. Proposant une démarche en trois temps, ce livre privilégie la réflexion individuelle à partir de bases théoriques solides pour permettre à chacun et chacune d’élaborer sa vision de l’enseignement, de construire ou de faire évoluer un enseignement, et de développer ses compétences pédagogiques.

This paper presents a game-theoretic model of a liberalized railway market, in which train operation and ownership of infrastructure are vertically separated. We analyze how the regulatory agency will optimally set the charges that operators have to pay to the infrastructure manager for access to the tracks and how these charges change with increased competition in the railway market. Our analysis shows that an increased number of competitors in the freight and/or passenger segment reduces prices per kilometer and increases total output in train kilometers. The regulatory agency reacts to more competition with a reduction in access charges in the corresponding segment. Consumers bene…t through lower prices, while individual pro…ts of each operator decrease through a higher number of competitors. We further show that the welfare e¤ect of increased competition in the freight and/or passenger segment is ambiguous and depends on the level of competition. Finally, social welfare is higher under two-part tari¤s than under one-part tari¤s if raising public funds is costly to society.

No abstract