We study the effects of volatility on financial crises by constructing a crosscountry database spanning over 200 years. Volatility itself is not a significant predictor of banking crises, but unusually high and low volatilities are. Low volatility is followed by credit build-ups, indicating that agents take more risk in periods of low risk consistent with Minsky instability hypothesis, and increasing the likelihood of a crisis. The effect is stronger when financial markets are more prominent and less regulated. Finally, both high and low volatilities make stock market crises more likely, while volatility in any form has no impact on currency crises.

This paper evaluates the model risk of models used for forecasting systemic and market risk. Model risk, which is the potential for different models to provide inconsistent outcomes, is shown to be increasing with market uncertainty. During calm periods, the underlying risk forecast models produce similar risk readings; hence, model risk is typically negligible. However, the disagreement between the various candidate models increases significantly during market distress, further frustrating the reliability of risk readings. Finally, particular conclusions on the underlying reasons for the high model risk and the implications for practitioners and policy makers are discussed.

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Over the last years, the detection of pesticide residues in the official food surveillance programs of Chile has been increased, mainly in fresh vegetables such as tomatoes and lettuces. The Metropolitana Region of Chile presents the highest detections in the country. The lack of evaluations of toxicological risks in human health have increased uncertainty of the potential effects of pesticides exposures in the Chilean population. This research aims to determinate health risks assessment of pesticide residues associated to tomatoes and lettuces produced in Metropolitana Region. The findings of this study reveal that tomatoes and lettuces cultivated in the MR show more than 50% of samples with one or multiple pesticides residues. From the total samples, 16% were over the Chilean Maximum Residue Levels (MRLs). The main pesticides detected in tomatoes and lettuces were methamidophos, methomyl, difenoconazole, cyprodinil and boscalid. The results obtained using the official data of the Ministry of Health of Chile (MINSAL) compared to the World Health Organization (WHO), describe relevant risks through the Estimated Daily Intakes (EDI), Hazard Quotients (HQ) and Hazard Index (HI) for the Chilean population due to high concentrations of methamidophos, methomyl and cyprodinil. More restrictions for the use of methamidophos, methomyl, difenoconazole, cyprodinil and boscalid and effective control programs should be implemented in order to mitigate the impacts on the Chilean population.

Since increasing a bank's capital requirement to improve the stability of the financial system imposes costs upon the bank, a regulator should ideally be able to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that banks classified as systemically risky really do create systemic risk before subjecting them to this capital punishment. Evaluating the performance of two leading systemic risk models, we show that estimation error alone prevents the reliable identification of the most systemically risky banks. We conclude that it will be a considerable challenge to develop a riskometer that is both sound and reliable enough to provide an adequate foundation for macroprudential policy.Keywords: Systemic risk, macroprudential policy, financial stability, risk management. This paper is published as part of the Systemic Risk Centre's Discussion Paper Series. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means without the prior permission in writing of the publisher nor be issued to the public or circulated in any form other than that in which it is published.Requests for permission to reproduce any article or part of the Working Paper should be sent to the editor at the above address. AbstractSince increasing a bank's capital requirement to improve the stability of the financial system imposes costs upon the bank, a regulator should ideally be able to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that banks classified as systemically risky really do create systemic risk before subjecting them to this capital punishment. Evaluating the performance of two leading systemic risk models, we show that estimation error alone prevents the reliable identification of the most systemically risky banks. We conclude that it will be a considerable challenge to develop a riskometer that is both sound and reliable enough to provide an adequate foundation for macroprudential policy.