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This paper(1) explores some aspects of the narrowness of Jung's usage of the term ego and the consequences which are understood to follow there from. Jung is understood to see the ego as a surface phenomenon and, essentially, as the focal point of consciousness, not recognizing its potential to function more broadly, deeply, and unconsciously. Furthermore, although he does recognize the ego as 'the total conscious personality' his use of the term frequently does not reflect that definition. Whilst Jung's analysis of the narrowly functioning ego is enlightening and groundbreaking, he treats this narrow functioning as if it is characteristic of the ego itself, ascribing any 'broad functioning' primarily to the Self. This narrow use of the term ego, and the corresponding use of the term Self, are understood to have significant consequences for clinical practice, including leading the analyst into an over-identification with the patient and a loss of the analyst's sense of self. It is also understood to lead to difficulties dealing with more disturbed individuals, to stuck and broken down analyses, to wear and tear on the analyst and, potentially, splits between the different schools of analytical psychology. These concerns all represent difficulties with working in the transference, and Jung's own experience of this is briefly explored.

This paper focuses on the transference-countertransference dynamics that manifest in work with those individuals who experienced severe early relational trauma and, in particular, childhood sexual abuse. The literature is surveyed from Davies and Frawley's (1992a) seminal paper through to more current trauma-related and sensorimotor approaches, which deepen our understanding greatly. The rapidly shifting, powerful, conflicting and kaleidoscopic transference-countertransference dynamics are explored in the light of these views and in relation to a lengthy clinical example. The author elucidates the dual-aspect of the traumatic complex, whereby the abuser figure, which is disavowed by the patient, becomes manifest in prosecuting the analyst for the 'wounds' that the analysis evokes. The paper also explores the particular nature of the splitting processes, whereby pressure is put on the analyst to adopt an idealized role, in particular to act as a self-object, in order to enable the patient to safely express and 'be' themselves in an attempt to make up for what was not possible in childhood; the analyst will necessarily fail in this task. In the context of powerful masochisto-sadistic dynamics, the analyst's masochism is likely to be called up in the spirit of caring 'humanity' (another inevitable enactment), which can impede the progress of the analysis if not addressed. The extreme woundedness, intense affect and moral outrage associated with these dynamics are characteristic and compelling. Issues relating to disclosure, enactment and analytic attitude are also discussed.

This paper describes the course of an analysis which demonstrates how borderline and narcissistic functioning can be understood in terms of a struggle with issues of identity. It shows how such functioning can come to exert a profound hold on the individual and why it seems, at times, a matter of life and death to the patient to avoid states of separation from the analyst. The paper suggests that these complex phenomena can be understood, perhaps surprisingly, in the simple terms of the nature of affect itself. The concept of the emotional core is introduced to embody and highlight that which lies beneath both Jungian and Freudian models (offering a potential bridge between the two models)--namely the psyche's essentially affective nature. It is suggested that the emotional core can serve as an organ of perception giving the individual both their primary relation to reality and an emotional attachment to others. This emotional core is understood to function in a narcissistic manner to preference experiences of sameness and in aversion to experiences of difference--a view consonant with Stern's understanding of infant development where the infant is able to distinguish self from other from the beginning of life (as Fordham also held); taking up Stern's terminology, it gives the individual a 'core' sense of being. There is, however, no stable, on-going sense of 'I' associated with this form of functioning as the individual is immersed in the latest affect to enter consciousness (as in the borderline state of mind) and consequently the individual comes to rely intensely on the other to determine their sense of being (the other becomes a self-regulating other in Stern's terms). The development of ego-functioning gives a more stable and on-going sense of 'I' to the individual, giving contact with the broader personality, allowing the individual to be less reliant on the other and orientating them to reality in a way more fitting to their overall needs. The paper describes how consciousness, which is not seen as identical with the ego, moves between the mode of functioning of the ego and that of the emotional core, i.e., shifting in and out of states where projective identification predominates. It elaborates the range of self-experience encompassing spiritual experience and states of disintegration (which are understood to have a similar structure) on one side, to ego-based experience (which can itself be defensive and rigid at times) on the other. It explores the consequences of such a view for analytic technique and relates it to the Jungian view of the self and the Freudian unconscious.