Координирующие долевые контракты в цепочке создания ценности: на примере киноиндустрии США shares in the fi nal allocation of revenues. Th e developed approach can support decision-making in effi ciency improvement at the stage of fi lm value chain establishment. It gives the mathematically justifi ed solutions which can serve as a starting point during contract negotiations between members of the fi lm value chain. Th e approach has been tested on the case studies from the USA motion picture industry and the applicability of coordinating contracts is demonstrated.
На основе построения теоретико-игровой модели и последовательной процедуры ее решения авторами предложена методика оценки дележа дохода от кооперации при реализации кинопроекта, которая апробирована на примерах известных кинопроектов Голливуда. Разработанная методика может быть использована для поддержки принятия решений в ходе многосторонних переговоров по формированию долевого контракта дележа дохода на кинорынках с возвратной системой финансирования. Ключевые слова: кинопроект, участники кинопроекта, доход кинопроекта, долевой контракт по распределению дохода, кооперативная игра, дележ дохода от кооперации, справедливый дележ, недоминируемый дележ, взвешенный недоминируемый дележ.
The paper considers the market of software products. Regularly this markets are suffering from dealing with a problem of countefeit or pirate products that are sold. Taking this into account the paper is solving the problem of price equilibrium on this market. The software company set the price and the quality of the software product while the countefeit or pirate company suggest the consumers the product of the lower quality. First the general model is analyzed and price equilibrium is defined. Second, the monopoly case is considered separately and optimal software price is defined. Finally, it is supposed that there are two companies that produces original software on the market who differentiate in quality, and there are two pirate companies who produces this software. The duopoly case is analysed and equilibrium prices for competing companies are obtained in the explicit form.
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