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Industrial Control Systems (ICS) and Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) applications monitor and control a wide range of safety-related functions. These include energy generation, where failures could have significant, irreversible consequences. They also include the control systems that are used in the manufacture of safety-related products. In this case, “bugs” in an ICS/SCADA system could introduce flaws in the production of components; these flaws remain undetected before being incorporated into safety-related applications. Industrial Control Systems, typically, use devices and networks that are different from conventional IP-based infrastructures. These differences prevent the re-use of existing cyber-security products in ICS/SCADA environments; the architectures, file formats and process structures are all different. This paper supports the forensic analysis of industrial control systems in safety-related applications. In particular, we describe how forensic attack analysis is used to identify weaknesses in devices so that we can both protect components and determine the information that must be analyzed during the aftermath of a cyber-incident. Simulated attacks detect vulnerabilities; a risk-based approach can then be used to assess the likelihood and impact of any breach. These risk assessments are then used to justify both immediate and longer-term countermeasures.

Abstract-This paper presents an empirical framework for implementing Situation Awareness Measurement Techniques in a Network Defense environment. Bearing in mind the rise of Cyber-crime and the importance of Cyber security, the role of the security analyst (or as this paper will refer to them, defenders) is critical. In this paper the role of Situation Awareness Measurement Techniques will be presented and explained briefly. Input from previous studies will be given and an empirical framework of how to measure Situation Awareness in a computing network environment will be offered in two main parts. The first one will include the networking infrastructure of the system. The second part will be focused on specifying which Situation Awareness Techniques are going to be used and which Situation Awareness critical questions need to be asked to improve future decision making in cyber-security. Finally, a discussion will take place concerning the proposed approach, the chosen methodology and further validation.

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