With a very high unemployment rate but at the first stage of a timid economic recovery, Spain held regional and local elections in May 2015. The election results showed the fall of traditional parties and the emergence of new forces and citizens? platforms, which increased the fragmentation of the party system. The PP (Partido Popular ? Popular Party) continued to be the most voted-for party but post-election agreements brought the left to power in eight of the 14 regions that held elections, ending four years of conservative general dominance. After commenting on the context, the campaign and the results of the elections, this article explores the main characteristics of the new party competition and examines the profile of those voting for new political alternatives

Classic studies of protest politics have traditionally defended the dominant left-wing orientation of protesters. However, some recent research has highlighted the general spread of protest by the increasing participation of right-wing individuals. Has this process meant an ?ideological normalisation? of protesters? The present article tackles this question by examining competing hypotheses regarding the relationship between ideology and political protest. Through a hierarchical multilevel design, the article tests whether left-wing (or right-wing) supporters are more likely to stay at home when left-wing (right-wing) parties are in power and whether they intensify their protest activities when they are more distant from the government?s ideological position. The article shows that left-wing individuals protest more under right-wing governments than under left-wing governments and yet, they are the group which protest the most also under left-wing governments. Both party mobilisation and values appear to be behind these individuals' greater propensity to participate regardless of the governments' ideological orientation

Anticipated trade, insurance, and fiscal shocks from independence structure preferences for secession independently from nonmaterial considerations. To test this claim, we draw from an original survey conducted in Catalonia before the 2017 regional election, which followed a suspended declaration of independence. Trade shocks produce differential effects depending on market specialization: Respondents working in sectors and at firms specializing in the host state market disproportionately oppose secession, whereas those specializing in foreign markets show no aversion to independence. Exclusion from public insurance strengthens preference for secession among the long‐term unemployed. Support for secession also increases with skill levels but not because of expected postindependence factor returns. The skilled population shows a better understanding of the institutional design of interterritorial redistribution. In a context of autonomy retraction, this group is more skeptical of the accommodation of regional demands within the union. Overall, we advance an individual‐level materialistic approach to the study of secession.

This paper tries to unveil the main factors behind the triumph of the proindependence vote in the 2017 Regional Election in Catalonia. The empirical analysis, which is carried out at the county level and by using a spatial econometric model, reveals that geographical location matters. The estimation results also suggest that the pro-independence vote is mainly linked to the birthplace of individuals. More specifically, it shows that the independence feeling is weaker the higher the share of citizens born outside Catalonia. On the other side, young and highly educated people are more prone to independence. Additionally, it is shown that people working in the public sector are more likely to vote for a political party in favor of Catalonia remaining in Spain, while the opposite happens for those voters working in construction. Finally, the results seem to dispel some myths associated with the role played by the county's size and level of income on the proindependence vote.

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