This paper presents the results of a test campaign meant to determine coupling paths into a laboratory test setup of typical power grid substation electronics. The devices were tested against conducted threats in a bulk current injection (BCI) setup and radiated threats inside a transverse electromagnetic (TEM) waveguide as well as with a near-field TEM horn antenna. The various excitation methods and different test setups offer the possibility to trace back the observed effects to coupling paths into the tested system. For frequencies below 300 MHz the dominating coupling path to the system under test (SUT) was determined to be the Ethernet cable connected to the telecontrol device. Above 800 MHz direct radiated coupling into the test devices was identified to be dominating. The conducted coupling via a predefined wiring harness with supply cabling was less relevant for both selected substation devices.

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This paper presents the results of a test campaign with focus on identifying HPEM susceptibilities for eight different secondary systems used in smart grid substations as part of the SCADA (Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition) system. The devices were tested against conducted threats in a bulk current injection (BCI) setup and radiated threats inside a TEM waveguide. Testing multiple devices of each type from different manufacturers and generations is necessary to acquire a representative overview of typical HPEM (High Power Electromagnetics) susceptibility thresholds of such systems. The tests were performed at frequencies ranging from 10 MHz to 3400 MHz whereas the failure behaviour of the tested devices strongly depends on frequency, polarization of the electromagnetic (EM) field and device type.

Abstract. The electricity sector has been undergoing transformations towards the smart grid concept, which aims to improve the robustness, efficiency, and flexibility of the power system. This transition has been achieved by the introduction of smart electronic devices (SEDs) and advanced automatic control and communication systems. Despite the benefits of such modernization, safety issues have emerged with significant concern by experts and entities worldwide. One of these issues is known as Intentional Electromagnetic Interference (IEMI), where offenders employ high-power electromagnetic sources to maliciously disrupt or damage electronic devices. One of the possible gateways for IEMI attacks targeting the smart grids is the microprocessor-based protection relays. On the one hand, the malfunctioning of these devices can lead to equipment damage, including high-voltage equipment (e.g., power transformers), which represent one of the most high-cost items of energy infrastructure. On the other hand, a possible misleading triggering of these devices could cause cascading effects along the various nodes of the power system, resulting in widespread blackouts. Thus, this study presents the possible recurring effects of IEMI exposure of a typical protection relay used in smart grid substations as part of the SCADA (Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition) system. For this purpose, a test setup containing a smart grid protective unit, a monitoring box, and the device's wiring harness is exposed to radiated IEMI threats with high-power narrowband signals using a TEM waveguide and horn antennas. The effects during the test campaigns are observed by means of an IEMI-hardened camera system and a software developed to real-time monitor the device's fibre optic communication link, which is established according to the IEC 60870-5-105 protocol. The results revealed failures ranging from display deviation to various types of protection relay shutdown. Moreover, the consequences of the identified failures in a power substation are discussed to feed into a risk analysis regarding the threat of IEMI to power infrastructures.