HPEM vulnerability of smart grid substations coupling paths into typical SCADA devices

Abstract

This paper presents the results of a test campaign meant to determine coupling paths into a laboratory test setup of typical power grid substation electronics. The devices were tested against conducted threats in a bulk current injection (BCI) setup and radiated threats inside a transverse electromagnetic (TEM) waveguide as well as with a near-field TEM horn antenna. The various excitation methods and different test setups offer the possibility to trace back the observed effects to coupling paths into the tested system. For frequencies below 300 MHz the dominating coupling path to the system under test (SUT) was determined to be the Ethernet cable connected to the telecontrol device. Above 800 MHz direct radiated coupling into the test devices was identified to be dominating. The conducted coupling via a predefined wiring harness with supply cabling was less relevant for both selected substation devices.

D-Dot Sensor Response Improvement in the Evaluation of High-Power Microwave Pulses

“…The power they generate ranges from several up to a dozen or so gigawatts. For this reason, the generated pulses are often called high-power microwave (HPM) pulses, if they are in a microwave frequency range, or high power electromagnetics (HPEM) in frequencies lower than 300 MHz [1][2][3][4][5]. A distinguishing feature of HPM pulses is their very short duration, which enables reaching high power values with a relatively limited energy expenditure.…”

Detecção e Correção de Outliers em Curvas de Potência Utilizando Técnica Híbrida de Inteligência Artificial

“…As redes elétricas estão evoluindo para sistemas inteligentes, conhecidas na literatura como Smart Grids, e necessitam cada vez mais de apoio ao gerenciamento da rede. O Sistema SCADA (Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition), portanto, tem papel fundamental nas novas infraestruturas dos sistemas elétricos de potência, que requerem uma comunicação integral com o centro de controle das concessionárias (Lanzrath et al, 2017).…”

HPEM Vulnerability of Smart Grid Substation Secondary Systems

“…The tests yielded generally a higher rf (radio frequency) immunity than the smart meter devices, but nevertheless the recorded malfunctions could have a greater impact on the grid management and the power grid itself. After gaining these insights, the same generic laboratory test setup has been investigated in more detail with focus on coupling paths into the System [5]. The dominating coupling path for frequencies below 450 MHz has been determined to be the ethernet cable connected to the telecontrol device as well as the DC supply line feeding the system.…”

“…In the present paper, a modified version of the basic laboratory test setup used in [5] is presented which features a new DUT arrangement as well as an optimized wiring layout to reduce the parasitic field coupling into feed lines and ethernet cables connected to the DUT. By using the modified laboratory setup, the HPEM susceptibility of three additional protection devices with varying manufacturer, type and generation as well as one additional next generation telecontrol device have been tested.…”

“…By using the modified laboratory setup, the HPEM susceptibility of three additional protection devices with varying manufacturer, type and generation as well as one additional next generation telecontrol device have been tested. This widespread DUT portfolio of typically installed secondary systems extended by the DUT tested in [5] provides a solid base for a reliable HPEM vulnerability analysis of smart grid substations. Based on the lessons learned from [5] and the test requirements requested in the IEC 61000-4-36 standard [6], the susceptibility tests performed in this paper focus on:…”