This article analyzes the effects of parliamentary representation on road infrastructure expenditure during the Spanish Restoration. Using a panel data set of Spanish provinces in 18801914, we find that the allocation of administrative resources among provinces depended both on the delegation characteristics (such as the share of MPs with party leadership positions, and their degree of electoral independence), and the regime's global search for stability. These results point to the importance of electoral dynamics within semi-democratic political systems, and offer an example of the influence of government tactics on infrastructure allocation. n 1874, after six years of political instability and civil strife, Spain returned to a parliamentary monarchy headed by the Bourbon dynasty. During the subsequent Restoration regime, two political parties (conservatives and liberals) formed a duopoly and alternated in power peacefully. At each turn the incumbent party ceded power to an interim government by the other party, who organized the election. The incoming government first planned a preliminary distribution of the chamber seats, which always involved its victory. Then, the appointed candidates had to negotiate the electoral results with local elites in their districts. At the local level, the national agreement was implemented through extensive vote buying, coercion and mass fraud, and by promising individual favors and indivisible benefits to

We study whether incumbents facing uncontested elections channel public spending towards co-partisan officials more than is the case of incumbents that are worried about their chances of re-election. To do so, we draw on data detailing capital transfers allocated by Spanish regions to local governments during the period 1995-2007. Using a regression discontinuity design, we document strong and robust effects. We find that, on average, a mayor belonging to the same party as that of the regional president obtains nearly twice the amount in grants as is received by a mayor belonging to an opposition party. This effect is much greater for regional incumbents that won the previous election by a large margin, but it disappears in the case of highly competitive elections. The effects estimated by difference-in-differences are not so great but they point in the same direction. Overall, the results are consistent with predictions that regional incumbents focus on obtaining the most votes possible when elections are strongly contested, while they seek to increase the number of aligned mayors when their position at the ballot box is not vulnerable. We study whether incumbents facing uncontested elections channel public spending towards co-partisan officials more than is the case of incumbents that are worried about their chances of re-election. To do so, we draw on data detailing capital transfers allocated by Spanish regions to local governments during the period 1995-2007. Using a regression discontinuity design, we document strong and robust effects. We find that, on average, a mayor belonging to the same party as that of the regional president obtains nearly twice the amount in grants as is received by a mayor belonging to an opposition party. This effect is much greater for regional incumbents that won the previous election by a large margin, but it disappears in the case of highly competitive elections. The effects estimated by difference-in-differences are not so great but they point in the same direction. Overall, the results are consistent with predictions that regional incumbents focus on obtaining the most votes possible when elections are strongly contested, while they seek to increase the number of aligned mayors when their position at the ballot box is not vulnerable. JEL Codes: C2, D72

We study whether incumbents facing uncontested elections channel public spending toward co–partisan officials more than is the case of incumbents that are worried about reelection. We draw on data on capital transfers allocated by Spanish regions to local governments during 1995–2007. Using a regression discontinuity design, we document strong and robust effects. We find that a mayor belonging to the party of the regional president obtains twice the amount in grants received by an opposition’s mayor. This effect is much greater for regional incumbents that won the previous election by a large margin, but it disappears for highly competitive elections. (JEL D72, H76)

). This research has received funding from projects ECO2009-12680/ECON (Ministerio de Educación y Ciencia) and 2009SGR102 (Generalitat de Catalunya). ABSTRACT:We examine whether state-level incumbents discriminate in the allocation of transfers in favour of local governments controlled by co-partisans, and whether the electoral prospects of local incumbents improve when they are aligned with the state incumbent. Using a new database covering around 3,000 Spanish municipalities during the period 2000-07 and a Regression Discontinuity design, we document a very strong and robust effect: in close races, municipalities aligned with the regional government obtain on average 83% more per capita transfers and their incumbents gain 10% more votes at the local elections. We also show that the effect of alignment is stronger: (i) when regional and local elections are held on the same day, (ii) in regions with less competitive regional elections, and (ii) in regions with more budget resources. Keywords: C2, D72JEL Codes: political parties, inter-governmental transfers, pork barrel politics RESUMEN:En este trabajo examinamos si, en la asignación de transferencias, los gobernantes regionales discriminan a favor de los gobiernos locales controlados por el mismo partido político, y si las perspectivas electorales de los gobiernos locales mejoran si están políticamente alineados con el gobierno regional. Con una nueva base de datos que considera 3.000 municipios españoles durante el período 2000-07 y un diseño de discontinuidad en la regresión, documentamos un efecto robusto de importante magnitud: en elecciones ajustadas, los municipios alineados con el gobierno regional reciben, en media, un 83% más de transferencias per cápita y su gobernante obtiene un 10% más de votos en las elecciones locales. También demostramos que el efecto de la alineación política es mayor: (i) si las elecciones regionales y locales se celebran el mismo día, (ii) en regiones donde las elecciones regionales son menos competidas, y (iii) en regiones con más recursos presupuestarios.3

We study whether incumbents facing uncontested elections channel public spending towards co-partisan officials more than is the case of incumbents that are worried about their chances of re-election. To do so, we draw on data detailing capital transfers allocated by Spanish regions to local governments during the period 1995-2007. Using a regression discontinuity design, we document strong and robust effects. We find that, on average, a mayor belonging to the same party as that of the regional president obtains nearly twice the amount in grants as is received by a mayor belonging to an opposition party. This effect is much greater for regional incumbents that won the previous election by a large margin, but it disappears in the case of highly competitive elections. The effects estimated by difference-in-differences are not so great but they point in the same direction. Overall, the results are consistent with predictions that regional incumbents focus on obtaining the most votes possible when elections are strongly contested, while they seek to increase the number of aligned mayors when their position at the ballot box is not vulnerable. We study whether incumbents facing uncontested elections channel public spending towards co-partisan officials more than is the case of incumbents that are worried about their chances of re-election. To do so, we draw on data detailing capital transfers allocated by Spanish regions to local governments during the period 1995-2007. Using a regression discontinuity design, we document strong and robust effects. We find that, on average, a mayor belonging to the same party as that of the regional president obtains nearly twice the amount in grants as is received by a mayor belonging to an opposition party. This effect is much greater for regional incumbents that won the previous election by a large margin, but it disappears in the case of highly competitive elections. The effects estimated by difference-in-differences are not so great but they point in the same direction. Overall, the results are consistent with predictions that regional incumbents focus on obtaining the most votes possible when elections are strongly contested, while they seek to increase the number of aligned mayors when their position at the ballot box is not vulnerable. JEL Codes: C2, D72