Pork-Barrel Politics in Semi-Democracies: The Spanish “Parliamentary Roads,” 1880–1914

Abstract

This article analyzes the effects of parliamentary representation on road infrastructure expenditure during the Spanish Restoration. Using a panel data set of Spanish provinces in 18801914, we find that the allocation of administrative resources among provinces depended both on the delegation characteristics (such as the share of MPs with party leadership positions, and their degree of electoral independence), and the regime's global search for stability. These results point to the importance of electoral dynamics within semi-democratic political systems, and offer an example of the influence of government tactics on infrastructure allocation. n 1874, after six years of political instability and civil strife, Spain returned to a parliamentary monarchy headed by the Bourbon dynasty. During the subsequent Restoration regime, two political parties (conservatives and liberals) formed a duopoly and alternated in power peacefully. At each turn the incumbent party ceded power to an interim government by the other party, who organized the election. The incoming government first planned a preliminary distribution of the chamber seats, which always involved its victory. Then, the appointed candidates had to negotiate the electoral results with local elites in their districts. At the local level, the national agreement was implemented through extensive vote buying, coercion and mass fraud, and by promising individual favors and indivisible benefits to

Political Regime and Public Social Spending in Spain: A Time Series Analysis (1850-2000)

“…This confirms the importance that qualitative studies have placed on the rise of the labour movement in the beginnings of Spanish social policy (Gabriel 2004, Castillo andMontero 2008). Also, this concurs with the results of Curto-Grau et al (2012), which show that road public investment in 1880-1914 was partly motivated by the government's pursuit of political stability. Indeed, the gradual (and small) increase in electoral representation of Spanish social-democracy after 1910 coincided with a period of increased social unrest.…”

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“…Curto- Grau et al (2014) investigate the pork barrel politics of road spending during the Spanish Restoration period, 1880-1914. They find that the regional allocation of funds for the construction of roads followed political factors, for instance the loyalty to the two-party alternation system.…”

Do politicians reward core supporters? Evidence from a discretionary grant program

“…2 1 Intergovernmental grants may also be influenced by direct democracy (Feld and Schaltegger 2005), voter turnout (Martin 2003), lobbying by local politicians (Borck andOwings 2003, Dalle Nogare andKauder 2016), the electoral geography of districts (Chen 2010), and legislative representation (Knight 2008). See Curto-Grau et al (2012) on the distribution of spending in semi-democratic Spain. Grants may in turn "mobilize" voters and thus give rise to higher voter turnout Snyder 2006, Vicente 2014).…”