Previous research indicates that political conservatism is associated with epistemic needs for structure and certainty (Jost et al., 2003) and that nouns elicit clearer and more definite perceptions of reality than other parts of speech (Carnaghi et al., 2008). We therefore hypothesized that conservatives would exhibit preferences for nouns (vs. verbs and adjectives), insofar as nouns are better suited to satisfy epistemic needs. In Study 1, we observed that social conservatism was associated with noun preferences in Polish and that personal need for structure accounted for the association between ideology and grammatical preferences. In Study 2, conducted in Arabic, social conservatism was associated with a preference for the use of nominal sentences (composed of nouns only) over verbal sentences (which included verbs and adjectives). In Study 3, we found that more conservative U.S. presidents used greater proportions of nouns in major speeches, and this effect was related to integrative complexity. We discuss the possibility that conservative ideology is linked to grammatical preferences that foster feelings of stability and predictability.

Intergroup contact is a known remedy for complicated intergroup relations. At the same time, contact is rare in postconflict settings. In the present article, we examine whether exposure to narratives about moral exemplars (i.e., members of a perpetrator group who acted morally and in opposition to the passivity or aggression displayed by majority) could increase openness to contact among historical adversaries. In Study 1 (N = 73), presenting members of a historical perpetrator group with information about ingroup moral exemplars led to a decrease of prejudice towards individuals from a historical victim group, which, in turn, resulted in higher openness to contact with them. In Study 2 (N = 100) and 3 (N = 92), exposure to narratives about outgroup moral exemplars in a historically victimized group increased openness to contact with members of a perpetrator group. These effects were mediated by a decrease in prejudice (Studies 2 and 3) and by an increase in trust towards historical perpetrators (Study 2).

Collective traumas may often lead to deep societal divides and internal conflicts. In this article, we propose that conspiracy theories emerging in response to victimizing events may play a key role in the breakdown of social cohesion. We performed a nationally representative survey in Poland (N = 965) two years after the Smoleńsk airplane crash in which the Polish president was killed, together with 95 political officials and high-ranking military officers. The survey found that people endorsing conspiratorial accounts of the Smoleńsk catastrophe preferred to distance themselves from conspiracy non-believers, while skeptics preferred greater distance to conspiracy believers. We also examined the role of people’s belief in the uniqueness of in-group historical suffering as an important antecedent of both conspiracy thinking and hostility towards outgroups (conspiracy believers and non-believers).

Both historians and lay people attempt to explain national histories. However, psychological research, to date, focused predominantly on the patterns of those explanations with regard to negative historical behaviors. In this article, we assess ethnocentrism of people's explanations of both negative and positive historical behavior of ingroup members (own nation) and outgroup members (other nation). Two studies analyze how Poles explain crimes and heroic acts committed in the General Government, as well as diverse behaviors during the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. The studies confirm an ethnocentric pattern of explanation: positive historical actions of ingroup members were explained more dispositionally than positive actions of outgroup members-negative historical actions of ingroup members were explained less dispositionally than negative historical actions of outgroup members. Furthermore, we found that this effect is more pronounced among individuals who highly identify with their nation. Apart from the influence of the strength of ingroup identification, we found that people who cling to structured knowledge (i.e. a high ability to achieve cognitive closure) tend to explain well-established historical facts (e.g. the Holocaust) but not little known facts (e.g. intervention in Czechoslovakia) in a more ethnocentric way.

Conspiracy beliefs constitute a propensity to attribute major events to powerful agents acting against less powerful “victims”. In this article we test whether collective victimhood facilitates conspiracy thinking. Study 1 showed that perceived group victimhood is associated with generic and group-specific conspiracy beliefs, but only for individuals who identify highly with their ingroup. Study 2 employed an experimental design to show that experimentally increased group victimhood leads to increased endorsement of conspiracy beliefs among high ingroup identifiers, but decreases endorsement of conspiracy beliefs among low identifiers. This effect was mediated by lack of trust towards outgroup members. Study 3 sought to replicate Study 2 in a different socio-political context. While Study 3 did not directly support the relationship between victimhood, group identification and conspiracy beliefs, an integrated meta-analysis of all three studies provides evidence for a significant interaction of victimhood and group identification in predicting conspiracy beliefs.