We analyze reported patches for three prior generate-andvalidate patch generation systems (GenProg, RSRepair, and AE). Because of experimental error, the majority of the reported patches violate the basic principle behind the design of these systems -they do not produce correct outputs even for the inputs in the test suite used to validate the patches. We also show that the overwhelming majority of the accepted patches are not correct and are equivalent to a single modification that simply deletes functionality.We also present Kali, a generate-and-validate patch generation system that simply deletes functionality. Working with a simpler and more effectively focused search space, Kali generates at least as many correct patches as prior GenProg, RSRepair, and AE systems. Kali also generates at least as many plausible patches that produce correct outputs for the inputs in the validation test suite as the three prior systems.We also discuss the patches produced by ClearView, a generate-and-validate binary hot patching system that leverages learned invariants to produce patches that enable systems to survive otherwise fatal defects and security attacks.

Many modern computations (such as video and audio encoders, Monte Carlo simulations, and machine learning algorithms) are designed to trade off accuracy in return for increased performance. To date, such computations typically use ad-hoc, domain-specific techniques developed specifically for the computation at hand.Loop perforation provides a general technique to trade accuracy for performance by transforming loops to execute a subset of their iterations. A criticality testing phase filters out critical loops (whose perforation produces unacceptable behavior) to identify tunable loops (whose perforation produces more efficient and still acceptably accurate computations). A perforation space exploration algorithm perforates combinations of tunable loops to find Pareto-optimal perforation policies. Our results indicate that, for a range of applications, this approach typically delivers performance increases of over a factor of two (and up to a factor of seven) while changing the result that the application produces by less than 10%.

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We present Prophet, a novel patch generation system that works with a set of successful human patches obtained from opensource software repositories to learn a probabilistic, applicationindependent model of correct code. It generates a space of candidate patches, uses the model to rank the candidate patches in order of likely correctness, and validates the ranked patches against a suite of test cases to find correct patches. Experimental results show that, on a benchmark set of 69 real-world defects drawn from eight open-source projects, Prophet significantly outperforms the previous state-of-the-art patch generation system.

We present ClearView, a system for automatically patching errors in deployed software. ClearView works on stripped Windows x86 binaries without any need for source code, debugging information, or other external information, and without human intervention.ClearView (1) observes normal executions to learn invariants that characterize the application's normal behavior, (2) uses error detectors to monitor the execution to detect failures, (3) identifies violations of learned invariants that occur during failed executions, (4) generates candidate repair patches that enforce selected invariants by changing the state or the flow of control to make the invariant true, and (5) observes the continued execution of patched applications to select the most successful patch.ClearView is designed to correct errors in software with high availability requirements. Aspects of ClearView that make it particularly appropriate for this context include its ability to generate patches without human intervention, to apply and remove patches in running applications without requiring restarts or otherwise perturbing the execution, and to identify and discard ineffective or damaging patches by evaluating the continued behavior of patched applications.In a Red Team exercise, ClearView survived attacks that exploit security vulnerabilities. A hostile external Red Team developed ten code-injection exploits and used these exploits to repeatedly attack an application protected by ClearView. ClearView detected and blocked all of the attacks. For seven of the ten exploits, ClearView automatically generated patches that corrected the error, enabling the application to survive the attacks and successfully process subsequent inputs. The Red Team also attempted to make ClearView apply an undesirable patch, but ClearView's patch evaluation mechanism enabled ClearView to identify and discard both ineffective patches and damaging patches.