Negative returns of shares in the long run after initial public offerings have been confirmed on many markets, however the explanation for the cause of this phenomenon is ambiguous. Investigating underperformance is important because it allows for a better understanding of the role of the stock markets in the financial system. Such a market anomaly influences the behaviour of investors in the long run. Underperformance features in an extensive body of empirical literature and has been confirmed in most cases, yet it is inconclusive as to what affects such phenomenona on the markets. The purpose of this paper was to present the explanatory theories based on the behaviour of market participants and to summarise the explanatory variables of underperformance that stem from the theory.

Sygnalizacja wyników finansowych w polityce dywidendowej na rynku NewConnectKeywords: dividend changes; future earnings; Poland Słowa kluczowe: zmiany dywidend; przyszłe wyniki finansowe; Polska JEL Code: G17; G30; G35 IntroductionThe aim of the paper is to examine whether changes in dividends may be treated as a signal from the managers about future performance of the company. We want to give evidence that in the market with high level of information asymmetry such as NewConnect (NC) payout policy may be interpreted as a tool for investors to build expectations about future financial results and therefore it could be a way of limitation the agency costs.The NC market is characterised by relatively low entry barriers, although they were even lower prior to the radical change of regulation introduced in 2013. The companies issue shares usually under private placement with low dispersion of ownership on the basis of a modest information document. The market is open to relatively small companies with higher investment risks. Main owners usually remain on the management boards and institutional investors hardly appear on the market. 302The market coverage of analysts is small (Top Pick NewConnect stocks are exception to the rule). On such a market, companies that pay regular dividends are rare, so we suspected that those who opted to pay would have preferred to use dividend policy as a communication tool to reduce information asymmetry.Our sample consists of 42 companies listed on the NC market between 2007 and 2016. The observation covered companies that had paid dividends for at least three consecutive years. A suspension of the payment for a maximum one year was allowed.This paper makes contribution to the literature based on the unique hand-collected data. There is still a research gap in the Polish market dealing with dividend as a tool of signalling of future results of companies quoted on alternative investment market

Market anomalies after initial public offerings are a subject of extensive scientific research. One of such anomalies is underpricing, which refers to an increase of stock price in relation to the offering price shortly after stock issue. The occurrence of underpricing has been verified in many markets; however, the reasons for this phenomenon have not been yet conclusively established. The existence of information asymmetry in the capital market is one of the most popular assumptions applied in the studies in an attempt to explain the reasons why issuers discount the price of their offers. The purpose of this paper is to present the explanatory underpricing theories which are based on the asymmetry of information present between market participants, and to summarize the explanatory variables of underpricing that stem from the theory.

Streszczenie: Zgodnie z teorią sygnalizacji dywidendy mogą być dodatkowym sposobem na komunikowanie się spółki z inwestorami i przekazywanie im określonych informacji przez zarząd. Celem pracy jest sprawdzenie, czy za pomocą zmian w polityce wypłaty dywidend spółki notowane na rynku o wysokim poziomie asymetrii informacji − takim, którego przykładem jest alternatywny rynek akcji NewConnect, sygnalizują zmianę wyników i cen akcji. W konsekwencji dywidendy mogą być sposobem na ograniczanie kosztów agencji przez zarząd spółki. Początkowa próba wykorzystana w badaniach składała się ze wszystkich spółek, które były notowane na NewConnect w latach 2007-2015, z czego wyłoniono spółki regularnie wypłacające dywidendy. Jako regularną wypłatę dywidendy przyjęto płatności dokonywane przez minimum 5 lat z rzędu, jednak dozwolone było zawieszenie płatności na maksymalnie jeden rok.