Six experiments compared spatial updating of an array after imagined rotations of the array versus viewer. Participants responded faster and made fewer errors in viewer tasks than in array tasks while positioned outside (Experiment 1) or inside (Experiment 2) the array. An apparent array advantage for updating objects rather than locations was attributable to participants imagining translations of single objects rather than rotations of the array (Experiment 3). Superior viewer performance persisted when the array was reduced to 1 object (Experiment 4); however, an object with a familiar configuration improved object performance somewhat (Experiment 5). Object performance reached near-viewer levels when rotations included haptic information for the turning object. The researchers discuss these findings in terms of the relative differences in which the human cognitive system transforms the spatial reference frames corresponding to each imagined rotation.Suppose you are playing a board game with a group of friends, and you want to know what the board looks like from one of their perspectives, without moving to it. There are two obvious ways to proceed. You could imagine rotating the board until the side corresponding to the new perspective is coincident with your current viewpoint (object rotation). Alternatively, you could imagine moving yourself to the vantage point of the new perspective (viewer rotation). Both operations have been implicated in human beings 1 ability to update objects and scenes across views (e.g.,

Previous neuroimaging studies of mental image transformations have sometimes implicated motor processes and sometimes not. In this study, prior to neuroimaging the subjects either viewed an electric motor rotating an angular object, or they rotated the object manually. Following this, they performed the identical mental rotation task in which they compared members of pairs of such figures, but were asked to imagine the figures rotating as they had just seen the model rotate. When results from the two rotation conditions were directly compared, motor cortex (including area M1) was found to be activated only when subjects imagined the rotations as a consequence of manual activity. Thus, there are at least two, qualitatively distinct, ways to imagine objects rotating in images, and these different strategies can be adopted voluntarily.

This study used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to investigate the neural mechanisms underlying two types of spatial transformations: imagined object rotations and imagined rotations of the self about an object. Participants viewed depictions of single threedimensional Shepard-Metzler objects situated within a sphere. A T-shaped prompt appeared outside of the sphere at different locations across trials. In the object rotation task, participants imagined rotating the object so that one of its ends was aligned with the prompt. They then judged whether a textured portion of the object would be visible in its new orientation. In the self rotation task, they imagined rotating themselves to the location of the T-prompt, and then judged whether a textured portion of the object would be visible from the new viewpoint. Activation in both tasks was compared to respective control conditions in which identical judgments were made without rotation. A direct comparison of self and object rotation tasks revealed activation spreading from left premotor to left primary motor (M1) cortex (areas 6/4) for imagined object rotations, but not imagined self rotations. In contrast, the self rotation task activated left supplementary motor area (SMA; area 6). In both transformations, activation also occurred in other regions. These findings provide evidence for multiple spatial-transformation mechanisms within the human cognitive system.

In four experiments on perceived object height and width, the effects of shifting participants' effective eye height (EEH) on affordance (intrinsic) and apparent size (extrinsic) judgments were contrasted. In Experiment 1, EEH shifts produced comparable overestimations of height in intrinsic and extrinsic tasks. A similar result was found with a more abstract extrinsic height task (Experiment 2). However, Experiment 3 revealed a dissociation between intrinsic and extrinsic tasks of perceived width. Mfordance judgments were affected by EEH shifts, whereas apparent size judgments were not. Experiment 4 compared participants' performance on comparable extrinsic tasks of height and width. Height judgments were affected by EEH shifts, but width judgments were again unaffected. It is concluded that eye height may be a more natural metric for object height than for width. Moreover, this difference reflects a basic flexibility within the human visual system for selectively attuning to the most accessible sources of size information.

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