In the first part of the paper we describe the philosophical debate on the expansions of cognitive science into the brain and into the environment, take sides against the “revolutionary” positions on them and in favor of a “reformist” approach, and conclude that the most appropriate model for cognitive sciences is pluralistic. This is meant in a twofold sense. On the one hand, mental phenomena require a variety of explanatory levels, whose inter-relations are of two kinds: decomposition and contextualization. On the other hand, the arguably quasi-holistic character of some cognitive tasks suggests that the mechanistic style of explanation has to be integrated in these cases with a dynamical explanatory style. This theoretical picture, however, raises two classes of problems: (a) the compatibility between the mechanistic-computationalist explanation and the dynamical one and (b) the nature of theoretical entities and relations postulated at the different levels of a pluralistic model involving computational explanations. Each point will be discussed in the second part of the paper.

This article outlines a socio-constructivist view of the ontogeny of an early form of psychological self-consciousness: an affective bodily self-consciousness. In so doing, it aims at contributing to a larger anti-Cartesian agenda, which rejects the claim of the primary nature of the knowledge of one’s own mental states. This will be pursued by seeking a synthesis of what may at first appear as a motley assortment of materials: the social biofeedback theory of parental affect-mirroring proposed by György Gergely and John S. Watson, Daniel Stern’s notion of forms of vitality, and Antonio Damasio’s concept of background feelings.

New Humanities is an international research and teaching project promoted by an interdisciplinary group of people from five different faculties and departments based at the University of Roma Tre. Initially set up as a forum for academic dialogue between the humanities and the sciences (including social sciences), the project became a transition space and platform for experiencing new research methodologies and teaching curricula that would question the present epistemological order of the European university system. In order to develop this approach, we have organized our work around a number of interdisciplinary clusters, each describing an epistemological node. In this paper we will discuss five interconnected case studies that emerged from an active collaboration between scientists and humanists. The first node, Protocols of Vision, investigates the cognitive nature of sensory perception and the different forms of knowledge it produces—empirical, artistic, and scientific. Memory: Mathematics, Computer Science, and Literature recapitulates many of the different threads in these discussions by exploring the interdependencies between the various kinds of memory: from external to subjective memory, from storage tools and techniques of self-construction to the invariance of mathematical structures. The third node, Signs and Bodies between Digital and Gendering, reflects on the problematic relationship between digital media and literary and linguistic gendering. Narrative Identity: Nature, Ontogeny and Psychopathology critically re-examines the main concepts and theories concerning the nature, ontogeny, and pathologies of the autobiographical self or narrative identity. Finally, the last node, Contribution of Quantum Physics to the Idea of Consciousness is a cross-cultural investigation into the phenomenon of consciousness tackled from the points of view of quantum field theory and ancient Indian philosophy

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In our opinion article we deal with the relationship between consciousness and the unconscious as it has taken shape within contemporary cognitive sciences, with a focus on the problem of the relationship between the personal and subpersonal levels of analysis of the mind. We begin by comparing the cognitive unconscious with the Freudian one, rejecting the project of converting psychoanalysis into an anti-naturalistic form of hermeneutics. Then we turn our attention to the so-called problem of "the mark of cognitive", emphasizing the difficulties that it raises for the eliminative project of developing a subpersonal model of the mind totally disengaged from personal-level psychology. We conclude with a plea for a more dialectical relationship between personal and subpersonal levels of analysis