Functions, levels, and mechanisms: Explanation in cognitive science and its problems

Abstract

In the first part of the paper we describe the philosophical debate on the expansions of cognitive science into the brain and into the environment, take sides against the “revolutionary” positions on them and in favor of a “reformist” approach, and conclude that the most appropriate model for cognitive sciences is pluralistic. This is meant in a twofold sense. On the one hand, mental phenomena require a variety of explanatory levels, whose inter-relations are of two kinds: decomposition and contextualization. On the other hand, the arguably quasi-holistic character of some cognitive tasks suggests that the mechanistic style of explanation has to be integrated in these cases with a dynamical explanatory style. This theoretical picture, however, raises two classes of problems: (a) the compatibility between the mechanistic-computationalist explanation and the dynamical one and (b) the nature of theoretical entities and relations postulated at the different levels of a pluralistic model involving computational explanations. Each point will be discussed in the second part of the paper.

Beyond the oversocialized conception of the subject in psychology: Desire, conflict, and the problem of social order

“…Second, there are some who advance philosophical psychologies deeply grounded in the work of one or more classic or recent philosophers and theorists (e.g., Aristotle, Dewey, Husserl, Lacan, Levinas). In a third type of project, the authors advocate for, develop, apply, or seek to improve scientific psychologies that might not (yet) be hegemonic, but that already have some legitimacy within the “mainstream” 5 or can be represented as “roads not taken” (Alessandroni, 2018; Marraffa & Paternoster, 2013; Milkowski et al, 2019; Nielsen & Ward, 2018; Wagoner, 2013).…”

Untitled

“…Марраффа и А. Патерностер считают недостаточными разрозненно существующие объяснительные модели в когнитивных науках: редукционизм, механистический анализ, объяснительный плюрализм, теория динамических систем, информационную теорию и др. (Marraffa, Paternoster, 2013). Они признают, что психические (когнитивные) явления требуют множества и разнообразия объяснительных уровней, которые взаимодействуют между собой через процессы декомпозиции и контекстуализации.…”

“…Есть и взгляды, соответствующие постмодернизму, -стремлению к плюрализму, для которого главной задачей является объяснение (любой ценой, в любом виде). Но наиболее перспективной из предложенных зарубежными авторами является когнитивная объяснительная модель, которая включает информационное объяснение психики через функционирование динамических систем (Marraffa, Paternoster, 2013).…”

An Ontology Design Pattern to Define Explanations

“…In the literature, psychological explanations have been defined as "models" providing a law, by means of which it is possible to describe a phenomenon while relating it to other, similar phenomena, and possibly to allow a prediction, intended as a future occurrence of the phenomenon [8,21]. Authors of [26] have highlighted how the mechanical aspect within the explanation process plays a central role into the recent psychology works. Phenomena are often explained by decomposing them into operations localised in parts (components) of the mechanism.…”