This article uses data from the 2000 Canadian Election Study to examine a variety of possible explanations for the gender gap in support for the new right. The authors find structural and situational explanations to be of little help in accounting for the gap. What matters are values and beliefs. The gender gap in support for Canada's new right party reflects differences in views about the appropriate role of the state, law and order, and traditional moral values. It also appears to reflect differences in the salience of politics in men's and women's lives. When all of these attitudinal factors are taken into account, the gender gap ceases to be significant. The implications of the findings are considered in light of comparative analyses of gender gaps in vote choice and support for radical right-wing populist political parties in Western Europe.

Abstract. Studies of federal judicial appointments made before 1988 discovered significant partisan ties between judicial appointees and the governments appointing them. In 1988, in response to criticism of these “patronage appointments,” the Mulroney government introduced screening committees to the process. This article explores the impact of these committees. Using information gained from surveys of legal elites, we trace the minor and major political connections of federal judicial appointees from 1989 to 2003 in order to determine whether patronage has continued despite the reform to the process. We discover that political connections continued to play an important role in who was selected for a judicial appointment. However, these connections were not quite as common as those found before 1988, and the new process does appear to have prevented the politically motivated appointment of completely unqualified candidates. Interestingly, our findings also suggest that the impact of patronage varies by region and interacts with other, newer influences, in particular, concerns for group representation on the bench. The paper concludes by briefly discussing these results in the context of the relationship between judicial selection and politics with a comparative perspective.Résumé. Les études sur les nominations judiciaires fédérales réalisées avant 1988 ont découvert des liens partisans étroits entre les juges nommés à la cour et les gouvernements les nommant. En 1988, en réponse aux critiques sur le favoritisme entourant les nominations, le gouvernement Mulroney a introduit des comités d'évaluation dans le processus. Cet article explore l'impact de ces comités. En utilisant de l'information recueillie lors de sondages menés auprès de la communauté légale, nous retraçons les connexions politiques mineures et majeures des attributaires judiciaires fédéraux de 1989 à 2003 en vue de déterminer si le favoritisme a persisté malgré la réforme du système. Nous découvrons que les connexions politiques continuent à jouer un rôle important dans la sélection des juges. Toutefois, ces connexions ne sont pas aussi importantes que celles qu'on a identifiées avant 1988 et le nouveau processus semble avoir réussi à prévenir les nominations partisanes de candidats entièrement non qualifiés. Les résultats de notre recherche suggèrent également que l'effet du favoritisme varie par région et dépend aussi d'autres facteurs plus nouveaux, en particulier le souci de représentation de certains groupes au sein de la magistrature. L'article conclut en discutant brièvement ces résultats dans le contexte de la relation entre la sélection judiciaire et la politique dans une perspective comparative.

The inter–institutional dynamics between courts and elected governments under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms have recently, and widely, been characterized as a "dialogue" over constitutional meaning. This article seeks to expand the systematic analysis of "dialogue" to lower courts of appeal, using Canadian federal government responses as a case study. In the process, the article clarifies the hotly debated operational definition of this metaphor, and develops two methodological innovations to provide a comprehensive measure of dialogue. The article's findings suggest that there is more dialogue with lower courts than with the Supreme Court of Canada. However, the evidence indicates that dialogue in the form of government appeals to higher courts–which explicitly signal the government's disagreement with the lower court–is as prevalent as legislative sequels, and the dominant form following judicial amendment.

The purpose of this article is to determine whether degenerative politics, a central proposition of democratic policy design theory or social constructivism, has been evident in Canadian youth criminal justice policy. Using a synchronic and diachronic case study design, the article conducts a rigorous content analysis of the legislative debates leading to the Young Offenders Act in 1982 and the Youth Criminal Justice Act in 2002. Policy makers’ social constructions of violent and nonviolent young offenders are measured, along with the benefit/burden content of the legislation, to determine whether young offenders have been caught in the downward spiral of degenerative politics. It finds evidence of degenerative politics for violent young offenders but not for nonviolent young offenders and explores some of the reasons for this divergence. Related Articles Related Media Films: Centre for Public Legal Education. . “Youth Criminal Justice in Action.” https://www.youtube.com/watch?v = KdZacGdgJrs International Public Policy Association. . “Public Policy Theory and Democracy.” http://www.ippapublicpolicy.org/teaching-ressource/public-policy-theory-and-democracy/9

Despite the impressive body of scholarship dedicated to analyzing litigation involving the Charter of Rights and Freedoms in the Supreme Court of Canada, there remains an incomplete understanding of why these cases come to the Court. Notably absent from the literature is sustained analysis of why governments, the most frequent class of appellant, bring Charter cases to the Supreme Court. Recent work has addressed the decision to appeal by the U.S. federal government and state attorneys general and provides an excellent theoretical starting point. I use case data collected from interviews with federal government lawyers and law reports to test whether the Canadian federal government's decisions to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada in Charter cases are also “procedurally rational.” I conclude that these decisions are primarily shaped by strategic considerations related to policy costs, case importance, reviewability, and the prospect of winning on appeal, regardless of the party in power. In the process, the article further extends the application of strategic decisionmaking theory with regard to law and courts beyond judicial behavior, and beyond the U.S. context.