Recently, Early Warning Signals (EWS) have been developed to predict tipping points in Earth Systems. This discussion highlights the potential to apply EWS to human social and economic systems, which may also undergo similar critical transitions. Social tipping points are particularly difficult to predict, however, and the current formulation of EWS, based on a physical system analogy, may be insufficient. As an alternative set of EWS for social systems, we join with other authors encouraging a focus on heterogeneity, connectivity through social networks and individual thresholds to change.

Hollow, M. (2014) 'Money, morals and motives : an exploratory study into why bank managers and employees commit fraud at work.', Journal of nancial crime., 21 (2). pp. 174-190. Further information on publisher's website:http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/JFC-02-2013-0010Publisher's copyright statement:This article is c Emerald Group Publishing and permission has been granted for this version to appear here http://dro.dur.ac.uk/13987/. Emerald does not grant permission for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from Emerald Group Publishing Limited. Additional information:Use policyThe full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-pro t purposes provided that:• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source • a link is made to the metadata record in DRO • the full-text is not changed in any way The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.Please consult the full DRO policy for further details.

Purpose-The aim of this paper is to evaluate the extent to which hubristic behaviour on the part of Thomas Farrow contributed to the downfall of Farrow's Bank in 1920. Design/methodology/approach-The article traces the way in which Thomas Farrow's behaviour changed over the course of his managerial career using primary sources obtained from various British archives, including: court records, witness statements, auditors' reports, newspapers, journals, and personal letters. The article then evaluates Farrow's actions in relation to the criteria outlined in Petit and Bollaert's "Framework for diagnosing CEO hubris" so as to assess how far he can be said to have become afflicted by managerial hubris. Findings-All the collected evidence points to the conclusion that Thomas Farrow had, by the time of the Bank's collapse in 1920, become afflicted by managerial hubris. This was reflected most clearly in the fact that he increasingly came to view himself as being somehow above and beyond the laws of the wider community. As a result, he felt little compunction about fraudulently writing-up the Bank's assets so as to cover the huge losses that his reckless investments had produced. Practical implications-The Farrow's Bank episode confirms that the probability of management hubris materialising is enhanced when external control mechanisms are either lacking or inefficiently applied. On top of this, the amateurish organizational setup of the Bank also suggests that the likelihood of hubris syndrome developing is enhanced when organizations themselves grant too much discretion to their leaders. Originality/value-The paper breaks new ground by applying the latest management and psychology theories on the subject of leadership hubris to the field of financial management. Its value lies in the fact that it provides scholars and practitioners with an in-depth insight into how hubris syndrome can develop in organizational settings.

Historically, one of the most prominent mediums through which new ideas about monetary systems have been presented and debated is the utopian treatise. That this was the case is, in many ways, not surprising since one of the core attractions of utopias is that they offerto both readers and writers -discursive spaces, free from the clutter and constraints of the present, within which alternate (improved) social and political systems can be laid out and analysed in their totality.1 As such, they provided a means through which thinkers of all political persuasions could articulate their thoughts and ideas as to how to overcome the various practical and ethical problems associated with money. Although a great many of the 2 forecasts for the future of money that were put forwards in this way had distinctly socialist undertones and were closely tied--in with the wider goals of alleviating poverty and social dislocation, this did not mean that the practical problems involved in actually establishing alternate monetary systems were not considered in--depth. 2 Indeed, the issue of whether or not there was a better alternative to conventional cash (or, indeed, if society could operate without it) was one that attracted a great deal of attention and continued to vex utopian thinkers right up until the twenty first century. 3

ABSTRACT:This article evaluates the inherent ambiguity of the landmark Park Hill housing estate in Sheffield, England. Incorporating Foucault's theories on governmentality and biopolitics, this article explores how techniques of power and control radically affected the way this building was both used and viewed. It shows how conflicting discourses about human needs and desires influenced the way that subjects were housed, managed and regulated in Sheffield during the supposedly homogeneous welfare-state years.