Scholars investigating activism against large dam developments in Asia usually focus on those campaigning, but not on those the campaigns are aimed at-the dam developers. Yet the developers' perspective is crucial to comprehensively understand the dynamics of social and environmental activism in SouthEast Asia as well as its implications for the region's energy landscape. This article analyzes the interplay of activists and Chinese dam developers in Myanmar via case studies of the Myitsone Dam and the Mong Ton Dam. The research is based on direct scholarly interaction with both activists and dam developers. It presents evidence of change from both sides: activists have professionalized in recent years; and Chinese dam developers now attempt to engage with civil society, albeit with limited success in the two cases studied. Yet, even with these changes, conflict over dam development persists, and the country may soon face severe limitations on development options for improving energy security. The case of Bhutan is also discussed to illustrate the potential of developing Myanmar's hydropower resources.

Scholars overwhelmingly adopt the case study method when analyzing causal conditions inducing antidam-protests. We have carried out the first medium-N-study on this topic analyzing public opposition to 12 dam projects in Asia. For this purpose, we employ a fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) which is based on a thorough review of scholarly writings and press reports on the dam projects at question as well as an online survey and semi-structured interviews. We identify two causal recipes sufficient for the emergence of significant anti-dam-protests. First, lacking social safeguards in combination with the presence of political opportunity structures and higher levels of development are sufficient for significant anti-dam-protests to emerge. Second, lacking social safeguards in combination with rampant corruption and environmental risk induce these protests. Current scholarly literature particuarly emphasizes political opportunity structures and development as causal conditions inducing significant protests. Our findings build on this literature to highlight the importance of project-specific conditions.

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The effects of the 1947 Panglong Agreement on Burma's ethnic minority groups can still be seen today in calls for a return to the spirit of Panglong, but there are conflicting versions of this event and its legacy. In order to grasp the prospects for ethnic unity in Burma, it is necessary to deconstruct the various ““myths”” of Panglong.

Chinese dam developers claim to construct at least every second dam worldwide. However, scholarly literature comprehensively investigating the social safeguard norms in these projects is rare. This paper analyses social safeguard norms in Chinese-led dam projects in Myanmar, Laos and Cambodia, hotspots of Chinese-led dam construction. We find that social safeguard norms adopted have significantly changed in the past 15 years. While Chinese dam developers claimed to adopt standards of the host countries upon the launch of China's Going Out Policy in 2001, with occasional adoption of more demanding Chinese standards, they did not adopt international norms. In recent years, however, they increasingly take into account international norms. We argue that the root cause for this change is social mobilization, with the suspension of the Myitsone Dam in 2011 as a particular game changer. Enhanced social safeguard legislation in host countries and China, stricter rules of Chinese funders and cooperation of Chinese dam developers with international players have also facilitated this change.