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We consider an optimal two‐country management of depleted transboundary renewable resources. The management problem is modelled as a differential game, in which memory strategies are used. The countries negotiate an agreement among Pareto efficient harvesting programs. They monitor the evolution of the agreement, and they memorize deviations from the agreement in the past. If the agreement is observed by the countries, they continue cooperation. If one of the countries breaches the contract, then both countries continue in a noncooperative management mode for the rest of the game. This noncooperative option is called a threat policy. The credibility of the threats is guaranteed by their equilibrium property. Transfer or side payments are studied as a particular cooperative management program. Transfer payments allow one country to buy out the other from the fishery for the purpose of eliminating the inefficiency caused by the joint access to the resources. It is shown that efficient equilibria can be reached in a class of resource management games, which allow the use of memory strategies. In particular, continuous time transfer payments (e.g., a share of the harvest) should be used instead of a once‐and‐for‐all transfer payment.

Although there may be considerable evidence that points out how new information technologies are able to bring about modifications in modern economies' operations, there is a need to identify better impacts on economic growth and productivity. While several micro-econometric studies exhibit a positive correlation between different measures of economic performance in industrial countries and IT investment, macroeconomic studies point out either a negative or non-existing correlation in terms of IT investment and the aggregate economy, and such can be applied not only in the United States but also to five other OECD countries. This chapter explores a cross-country analysis that is based mainly on an explicit economic growth model that adopts data from the International Data Corporation (IDC).

The benefits from the New Economy should accrue as improvements in productivity and economic growth. But while the use of information and communication technology seems to have had a substantial impact on the performance of the United States economy, the evidence for other countries is much weaker. This study does not find any significant correlation between ICT investment and economic growth in the period 1985-99 for a sample of 42 countries for which ICT spending data are available. Even more surprisingly and in contrast with some previous studies, the relationship is not statistically significant for the subsamples of industrial or high-income countries either. There are at least three possible explanations for this apparent 'productivity paradox'. The most obvious one is the fact that not many countries, other than the US, have yet invested much in ICT. The second reason is that even if they have done so, they may not have invested enough in complementary infrastructure, like education and skills, in order to reap the benefits from ICT investment. Technology by itself is not a solution to any development problem; it only provides an opportunity. The third and the most controversial explanation is that the neoclassical method applied in assessing the …/.