We argue that courts may increase their autonomy and effectiveness by persuading governmental actors, who have powers over the societal impact of judicial decisions, of the legal quality of their rulings. This view combines a strategic perspective on judicial decision making with a conception of persuasion that allows courts to widen their zone of discretion. We support our argument with data from the European Union, where we find that the Court of Justice improves its legal justifications-by embedding its decisions in case law-when it faces a more adverse political environment. Our findings suggest both that the limits of judicial independence are set largely by political preferences, and that legal rhetoric may be an opportunity for courts to extend their room for maneuver. They also indicate that political audiences may indirectly influence the development of case law, by triggering courts to engage in precedent.

Researchers use community-detection algorithms to reveal large-scale organization in biological and social networks, but community detection is useful only if the communities are significant and not a result of noisy data. To assess the statistical significance of the network communities, or the robustness of the detected structure, one approach is to perturb the network structure by removing links and measure how much the communities change. However, perturbing sparse networks is challenging because they are inherently sensitive; they shatter easily if links are removed. Here we propose a simple method to perturb sparse networks and assess the significance of their communities. We generate resampled networks by adding extra links based on local information, then we aggregate the information from multiple resampled networks to find a coarse-grained description of significant clusters. In addition to testing our method on benchmark networks, we use our method on the sparse network of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) case law, to detect significant and insignificant areas of law. We use our significance analysis to draw a map of the ECJ case law network that reveals the relations between the areas of law.

It is generally agreed that some judgments by the Court of Justice are more important than others, but the ability of traditional legal methods to identify such judgments is inherently limited. In this article, we apply various tools developed in network analysis to identify which judgments are the most important as legal precedents. The study reveals that certain well-known judgments, like van Gend en Loos, have limited importance as precedents, while other judgments, like Bosman, PreussenElektra and Schumacker, are likely overlooked.

The case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) is one of the most important sources of European Union law. However, case law's role in EU law is not uniform. By empirically studying how the Court uses its own case law as a source of law, we explore the correlation between, on the one hand, the characteristics of a CJEU case—type of action, actors involved, and area of law—and, on the other hand, the judgment's “embeddedness” in previous case law and value as a precedent in subsequent cases. Using this approach, we test, confirm, and debunk existing scholarship concerning the role of CJEU case law as a source of EU law. We offer the following conclusions: that CJEU case law cannot be treated as a single entity; that only a limited number of factors reliably affect a judgment's persuasive or precedential power; that the Court's use of its own case law as a source of law is particularly limited in successful infringement proceedings; that case law is particularly important in preliminary references—especially those concerning fundamental freedoms and competition law; and that initiating Member State and the number of observations affects the behavior of the Court.

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