Contrary to what is often assumed since the seminal studies of Puech, I argue that Numenius’ interest in Oriental Wisdom is part of his Platonist stance. The most important testimony is fr. 1a des Places, which shows that Plato is not only the reference‑point but also the criterion and measure to judge the truthfulness of the other philosophical traditions and religions. Numenius’ dualism therefore can be explained as an attempt to preserve the transcendence of the first principle, the typical problem of Middle Platonists as opposed to Hellenistic philosophies such as Stoicism.

A clarification of Plutarch's attitude towards scepticism will help us to assess his Platonist stance. But his attitude is not clear and scholars diverge, ranging from the view that Plutarch was not interested at all in scepticism to the hypothesis that he might have had a sceptical phase or even that his entire philosophy was sceptical. A solution can be found if Plutarch's interpretation of the Hellenistic Academy is correctly reconstructed and if its difference from Pyrrhonism is considered. Plutarch claims that Pyrrhonism is nothing but the result of an empiricist ontology and epistemology, whereas what distinguishes Academic scepticism is an anti-empiricist stance. More precisely, an analysis of the treatise Against Colotes shows that Academic polemics against Epicurean empiricism involve the acknowledgment of the dualism between the sensible and the intelligible which is distinctive of all Platonist philosophy. If one considers only the senses and the sensible dimension life would be impossible; but the very fact that we live shows, according to Plutarch's interpretation of Arcesilaus, that something else, the intelligible, exists. By exploiting the so-called apraxia argument and by interpreting Arcesilaus' philosophy against the background of dualism, Plutarch can therefore claim that also the Hellenistic Academics can be regarded as loyal heirs of Plato.

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