Three studies examined preferences for outcomes to self and a codisputant. Studies 1 and 2 estimated social utility functions from judgments of satisfaction with alternative outcomes. Comparing functional forms, we found that a utility function, including terms for own payoff and for positive and negative discrepancies between the parties' payoffs (advantageous and disadvantageous inequality), provides a close fit to the data. The typical utility function is steeply increasing and convex for disadvantageous inequality and weakly declining and convex for advantageous inequality. We manipulated dispute type (personal, business) and disputant relationship (positive, neutral, or negative) and found that both strongly influence preferences for advantageous but not disadvantageous inequality. A third study contrasted implications of the social utility functions with predictions of individual utility theories.

Arguably, all judgments and decisions are made in 1 (or some combination) of 2 basic evaluation modes-joint evaluation mode (JE), in which multiple options are presented simultaneously and evaluated comparatively, or separate evaluation mode (SE), in which options are presented in isolation and evaluated separately. This article reviews recent literature showing that people evaluate options differently and exhibit reversals of preferences for options between JE and SE. The authors propose an explanation for the JE/SE reversal based on a principle called the evaluability hypothesis. The hypothesis posits that it is more difficult to evaluate the desirability of values on some attributes than on others and that, compared with easy-to-evaluate attributes, difficult-to-evaluate attributes have a greater impact in JE than in SE. Illinois 60637. Electronic mail may be sent to chris.hsee@gsb.uchicago.edu. 1 SE refers both to (1) situations where different options are presented to and evaluated by different individuals so that each individual sees and evaluates only one option, and to (2) situations where different options are presented to and evaluated by the same individuals at different times so that each individual evaluates only one option at a given time. The former situations are pure SE conditions. The latter situations involve a JE flavor because individuals evaluating a later option may recall the previous option and make a comparison. 576This document

People routinely engage in dishonest acts without feeling guilty about their behavior. When and why does this occur? Across four studies, people justified their dishonest deeds through moral disengagement and exhibited motivated forgetting of information that might otherwise limit their dishonesty. Using hypothetical scenarios (Studies 1 and 2) and real tasks involving the opportunity to cheat (Studies 3 and 4), the authors find that one's own dishonest behavior increased moral disengagement and motivated forgetting of moral rules. Such changes did not occur in the case of honest behavior or consideration of the dishonest behavior of others. In addition, increasing moral saliency by having participants read or sign an honor code significantly reduced unethical behavior and prevented subsequent moral disengagement. Although dishonest behavior motivated moral leniency and led to forgetting of moral rules, honest behavior motivated moral stringency and diligent recollection of moral rules.

A series of financial scandals revealed a key weakness in the American business model: the failure of the U.S. auditing system to deliver true independence. We offer a two-tiered analysis of what went wrong. At the more micro tier, we advance moral seduction theory, explaining why professionals are often unaware of how morally compromised they have become by conflicts of interest. At the more macro tier, we offer issue-cycle theory, explaining why conflicts of interest of the sort that compromise major accounting firms are so pervasive.

The first part of this paper traces a short history of the psychological study of negotiation. Although negotiation was an active research topic within social psychology in the 1960s and 1970s, in the 1980s, the behavioral decision perspective dominated. The 1990s has witnessed a rebirth of social factors in the psychological study of negotiation, including social relationships, egocentrism, motivated illusions, and emotion. The second part of this paper reviews five emerging research areas, each of which provides useful insight into how negotiators subjectively understand the negotiation: (a) mental models in negotiation; (b) how concerns of ethics, fairness, and values define the rules of the game being played; (c) how the selection of a communication medium impacts the way the game is played; (d) how cross-cultural issues in perception and behavior affect the negotiation game; and (e) how negotiators organize and simplify their understandings of the negotiation game when more than two actors are involved.