Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) is a type of sealed-bid auction of multiple items which has good economic properties. However, VCG has security vulnerabilities, e.g. it is vulnerable to auctioneer fraud. To make VCG more practical, bid prices must be well protected. To tackle this challenge, we propose a bidder-oriented, privacy-preserving auction scheme using homomorphic encryption, where the bidders can calculate the results by themselves, and the auctioneer is able to verify the results. Compared to previous research, our scheme is more trustworthy with stronger privacy.

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Due to the popularity of auction mechanisms in real‐world applications and the increasing awareness of securing private information, auctions are in dire need of bid‐privacy protection. In this paper, we design three secure, multi‐unit, sealed‐bid, first‐price auction schemes. The first is a secure auction using homomorphic encryption and is denoted by SAHE; the second is a secure action using masking values and is denoted by SAMV; and the third has an improved masked noise algorithm, denoted by ISAMV. In the first, SAHE, the auction is processed on encrypted bids by a server, and the final output is only known by the auctioneer. Neither the auctioneer nor the server can obtain the full information of the bidders. The second and third auctions, SAMV and ISAMV, decrease computational complexity. Instead of homomorphic encryption, they use random noise to mask the bid values. By using a masking method, the server only knows the noise, and the auctioneer only knows the auction results; neither will see the private information of the bidders. All three schemes enable the auctioneer to verify that the winners have paid the correct amounts. A thorough theoretical analysis is performed to evaluate the security properties, computational complexity, and communication complexity of the auctions. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Due to the popularity of auction mechanisms in real-world applications and the increase in the awareness of securing private information, auctions are in dire need of bid-privacy protection. In this paper, we deliberately design a secure multi-unit sealed-bid first-price auction scheme, in which the auction is processed on the bidders' encrypted bids by the server and the final output is only known by the auctioneer. As a result, neither the auctioneer nor the server can obtain the full information of the bidders. What's more, the auctioneer can verify whether a winner pays its full payment in the auction. Finally, a comprehensive analysis on the performance of our auction mechanism is conducted.

Abstract. The development of vehicular ad-hoc networks has lead to several new services, such as instant messages, multi-media videos and large data transmissions. These applications have altered the pattern of data transmissions on VANETs to include larger volumes of data with different file sizes. Unstable links in vehicular networks are common due to channel fading and because of the vehicle moving, file transmissions are vulnerable to link interruption. How to utilize the limited link duration to transfer more files of different sizes successfully is a significant problem. Currently, the common practice to schedule file transmissions is a First In First Out (FIFO) mechanism defined in the DSRC (Dedicated Short Range Communication) standard. The algorithms presented in this paper show significant performance improvements. We proposed two algorithms, one based on transmission times and one based on due times. Both algorithms solve this problem by dynamically scheduling the file transmitting sequence according to selected criteria. Simulation results show that our algorithms significantly improve performance compared with FIFO mechanism for the transmission success rate and the network throughput.