This article examines the role of historical science in clarifying the causal structure of complex natural processes. I reject the pervasive view that historical science does not uncover natural regularities. To show why, I consider an important methodological distinction in geology between uniformitarianism and actualism; methodological actualism, the preferred method of geologists, often relies on historical reconstructions to test the stability of currently observed processes. I provide several case studies that illustrate this, including one that highlights how historical narratives can improve predictive models.

According to the world-actualization model (WAM), God creates by selecting and actualizing a possible world. This chapter argues that WAM is in tension with divine creativity. To flesh out the nature of creativity, three types of creative thought processes described by Margaret Boden are introduced. It is then argued that the God of WAM fails to exhibit any of them. Next, the chapter explores several ways one might try to ease the tension between divine creativity and the world-actualization model, including potential transformations of WAM itself, but none of these appear particularly satisfactory. The chapter concludes with three desiderata one ought to satisfy in creating a creative model of creation; a truly creative God must display originality, purpose, and world-specific intentions in the creation of the world.

While faith is often described as a cognitive state, many philosophers argue that faith includes a noncognitive factor, and is not merely a species of belief. In this chapter, a novel model of this affective component is developed, based on recent work in clinical psychology concerning the relationship between posture and approach motivation. It further argues that this model accurately represents many crucial features of faith: faith can motivate us to act against our desires, faith is both voluntary and passive, faith makes us vulnerable, faith is an activity, and faith can intensify belief.

This paper explores the relationship between analytic theology and science-engaged theology through a historical lens, connecting contemporary disagreements between analytic metaphysicians and philosophers of science to a disagreement about philosophical method between Carnap and Quine. After discussing philosophical issues of meaning and verification in early positivism, the paper goes on to suggest that the analytic-synthetic distinction underlying much work in analytic theology is difficult to maintain when engaging with empirical methods of knowledge production such as science. To move forward, then, analytic theologians who wish to pursue science-engaged theology need a constructive methodology that embraces a blurring of the analytic-synthetic distinction. A rough sketch of one such research program, analytic-synthetic science-engaged theology, is offered as a potential ASSET for systematic theologians who wish to engage with natural and human sciences.

No abstract