The Role of Historical Science in Methodological Actualism

Abstract

This article examines the role of historical science in clarifying the causal structure of complex natural processes. I reject the pervasive view that historical science does not uncover natural regularities. To show why, I consider an important methodological distinction in geology between uniformitarianism and actualism; methodological actualism, the preferred method of geologists, often relies on historical reconstructions to test the stability of currently observed processes. I provide several case studies that illustrate this, including one that highlights how historical narratives can improve predictive models.

Actualism and Uniformitarianism: From Abstract Commitments to Forms of Practice

“…In her stimulating paper, “The Role of Historical Science in Methodological Actualism,” Meghan Page makes a number of important points about the sciences of geohistory. While some have argued that these sciences are merely consumers, not producers, of lawlike generalizations, Page observes that historical research plays “an important and ineliminable role in advancing our knowledge of causal structure and stable regularities” (Page 2021, 462). It does this by supplying “an experimental context” to test the stability of currently observed processes and relationships.…”

“…Instead, we should regard them as forms of practice enjoining a basically comparative approach to geological problem-solving. This permits a recovery of Page’s main conclusions, since the approach she terms “methodological actualism” involves a distinct form of practice geared to determining “the limits of observed regularities”: a strategy that is best interpreted as a response to the limitations of the traditional comparative project (Page 2021, 477).…”

“…Methodological uniformitarianism, by contrast, is a procedural principle asserting “the invariability of natural laws in space and time” (Gould 1965, 224). Noting a difference in focus between these senses (the former is about is about rates of change and material conditions, the latter is about the laws regulating these things), Page renames Gould’s methodological uniformitarianism “methodological actualism ,” and observes that this “leave[s] room” for the categories of substantive actualism and (redefined) methodological uniformitarianism (Page 2021, 470). She defines “methodological actualism” as “[an] undemonstrable, although entirely necessary, procedural assumption asserting spatial and temporal invariance of laws describing the operation of nature’s processes.” “Methodological uniformitarianism,” by contrast, is “[an] undemonstrable, although entirely necessary, procedural assumption asserting constancy of rates of change or material conditions through time.” 5…”

“…Whereas Gould uses the term “methodological uniformitarianism” to refer to the assumption that natural laws are spatiotemporally invariant, Page would have us speak of “methodological actualism.” The problem is that Page does not just use “methodological actualism” to refer to a procedural assumption involving the stability of natural laws. She also uses it to pick out an investigative project or methodology that uses historical reconstructions “to test the stability of presently observed processes over large time periods” (Page 2021, 480–81). Methodological actualism, in this sense, “often requires using knowledge of the past to determine the stability of currently observed regularities” (462).…”

The Contentious Compatibility of Evolution and Design: Introduction to the Book Symposium

“…Kojonen takes the second, but exploring the first could be productive, and Glass gives good reasons to find it attractive. The second contribution from philosophy is by Meghan Page (Loyola University Maryland), whose research is in the philosophy of science, particularly historical science (Page 2021), as well as overlaps between the philosophies of science and religion (Page 2018). Page raises a number of objections to Kojonen's approach and design arguments more generally; these include apparent bad design and disputing whether a relevant kind of conjunctive explanation can be achieved.…”