The global rush to develop the 'blue economy' risks harming both the marine environment and human wellbeing. Proactive, systematic and bold policies and actions are urgently required to chart an environmentally sustainable and socially equitable course for the blue economy.Concerns about the state of the world's oceans are widespread 1,2 . At the same time, interest in their untapped economic potential is escalating. The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) projects that the contribution of the ocean to global GDP could double from US$1.5 trillion in 2010 to US$3 trillion by 2030 3 . Ocean sectors, including fisheries, aquaculture, marine tourism, bio-prospecting, seabed mining, oil and gas, renewable energy, and shipping, are heralded by numerous actors and nations as lucrative frontiers for investment. The 'blue economy' -a term that encapsulates international interest in the growth of ocean-based economic development -has been a central theme in numerous recent global ocean policy conferences 4,5 .

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This article addresses the question of how states can best promote citizens' compliance with laws that regulate livelihoods. Based on ethnographic data from fishing communities in three countriesFNorway, Canada, and South AfricaFthe article compares compliance motivations that exist under different socioeconomic and political conditions. The comparisons give rise to a typology of three compliance motivations: deterrence, moral support for the law's content, and the legislator's authority. This article then identifies three governable preconditionsFenforcement, empowerment of citizens, and civic identityF that respectively explain these motivations. The article argues that the compliance discourse in a given type of state must be framed such that it includes at least the governable preconditions for compliance that have not been met in that state. Consequently, a functional compliance strategy would vary between different state types. The article thus questions the transferability of the developed world's compliance discourses to the developing world.

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