Rethinking small-scale fisheries compliance

Sowman, Merle

doi:10.1016/j.marpol.2007.11.004

Cited by 158 publications

(126 citation statements)

References 33 publications

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“…Fishermen are known to pay bribes (monetary and nonmonetary) to inspectors from this authority to avoid sanctions for noncompliance (see Hauck and Kroese 2006;Hauck 2008;Hauck and Fernández-Gallardo 2013;Sundström 2013). 1 Moreover, support for the regulations is perceived as low among 1 For a discussion on how the marine regulations and their implementation in South Africa differ from neighboring states in the region, see Sjöstedt and Sundström 2013;Sjöstedt and Sundström 2014. fishermen, and rule violations in this sector are widespread (e.g., Raemaekers and Britz 2009;Pramod 2011).…”

Section: Contextmentioning

confidence: 99%

Corruption and Violations of Conservation Rules: A Survey Experiment with Resource Users

Sundström

2016

World Development

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Small-scale corruption in government administrations that govern natural resources is believed to have a negative impact on conservation management. Yet, while corruption is said to obstruct the implementation of conservation policies, for instance as bribery may enable poaching in protected reserves, it is an underexplored area of research. This study investigates the effect of corruption, others' compliance behavior, and support for regulations on rule-violating intentions. In a betweensubjects experiment, a sample of resource users active in South African small-scale fisheries (N = 201) answered questions about rule-violating intentions after reading one of four scenarios, each depicting a different situation of corruption among officials that enforce regulations and compliance behavior of other resource users. The results show that resource users are more likely to state rule-violating intentions when corruption among inspectors is widespread. Moreover, there is an interaction effect with support for conservation regulations, suggesting that the effect of corruption is stronger among individuals who do not support such rules. These findings lend further support for the proposition that to improve the effectiveness of conservation policy, more effort is needed to reduce bribery among government officials, such as rangers and inspectors that enforce natural resource regulations.

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Section: Contextmentioning

confidence: 99%

Corruption and Violations of Conservation Rules: A Survey Experiment with Resource Users

Sundström

2016

World Development

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“…In his analysis, Nielsen [8] reasons that compliance to regulations depends on the legitimacy of the regulatory system in relation to the context and procedure, and the role fisheries management institutions play in the coordination and allocation of resources. Additionally, Hauck [33] relates non-compliance to the processes of law formation and power dynamics embedded in such processes. Moreover, Eggert and Lokina [34], in their study of regulatory compliance in Lake Victoria, reason that compliance is influenced by people's moral obligation to comply, as well as by legitimacy of the regulations, in addition to the probability of detection and punishments.…”

Section: The Interactive Governance Perspective In Addressing Iuu Promentioning

confidence: 99%

A Bottom-Up Understanding of Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing in Lake Victoria

2016

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Illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing is a major concern in fisheries management around the world. Several measures have been taken to address the problem. In Lake Victoria, the alleviation of IUU fishing is implemented through the Regional Plan of Action (RPOA-IUU), which restricts use of certain fishing gear, as well as prohibits fishing in closed areas and during closed seasons. Despite the long-term efforts to monitor and control what goes on in the fisheries, IUU fishing has persisted in Lake Victoria. Inspired by interactive governance theory, this paper argues that the persistence of IUU fishing could be due to different images that stakeholders have about the situation, rather than the lack of management competency. Through structured interviews with 150 fisheries stakeholders on Ijinga Island in the southeastern part of Lake Victoria, Tanzania, using paired comparison questionnaires, the study elicits stakeholders' perspective about the severity of different locally-pertinent fishing-related activities. The results show that while fisheries stakeholder groups agree on their judgments about certain fishing gears, some differences are also apparent. For instance, fisheries managers and scientists do not always agree with fishing people about what activities cause the most damage to fisheries resources and ecosystem. Further, they tend to consider some IUU fishing-related activities less damaging than some non-IUU fishing. Such disparity creates governability challenges, pointing to the need to revisit relevant regulatory measures and to make them consistent with the knowledge and judgments of all stakeholders. Based on these findings, we discuss governing interventions that may contribute to addressing IUU fishing in Lake Victoria and elsewhere.

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“…Kagin and colleagues argue that the effects of environmental law and regulation eclipses traditional instrumental impacts such as deterrence to include interactions between environmental compliance and social pressures (see also, Gunnington, Kagin, and Thornton 2004). Similar arguments have been applied to other environmental issues of compliance (Hauck 2008).…”

Section: Empirical Assessments Of Deterrence and Environmental Crimementioning

confidence: 98%

The Weak Probability of Punishment for Environmental Offenses and Deterrence of Environmental Offenders: A Discussion Based on USEPA Criminal Cases, 1983–2013

et al. 2016

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Numerous studies observe a decrease in environmental crimes following imposition of fines or penalties potentially due to general and specific deterrent effects. Here we explore whether those deterrent effects appear plausible by estimating the probability of a USEPA criminal case occurring each year between 1983 through 2013. Our analysis shows that there is an extremely low probability of an environmental crime case being prosecuted criminally by USEPA, casting doubt that these criminal cases are sufficiently widespread to generate a deterrent effect. We suggested that alternative theoretical orientations and policy initiatives be employed in studying and responding to environmental infractions.

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Rethinking small-scale fisheries compliance

Cited by 158 publications

References 33 publications

Corruption and Violations of Conservation Rules: A Survey Experiment with Resource Users

Corruption and Violations of Conservation Rules: A Survey Experiment with Resource Users

A Bottom-Up Understanding of Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing in Lake Victoria

The Weak Probability of Punishment for Environmental Offenses and Deterrence of Environmental Offenders: A Discussion Based on USEPA Criminal Cases, 1983–2013

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