Political science scholarship has found mixed evidence on the impact of partisanship on the taxation of firms. In this article, I show that although left-leaning governments set tax rates at higher levels than right-leaning governments, the difference in the effective tax rates paid by firms is much less dramatic between left and right governments. I argue that left-leaning governments maintain high tax rates, a visible policy their constituency supports, while allowing firms to transfer profits abroad to minimize their tax burden (transfer pricing). Constituency costs hinder them from cutting tax rates to avoid backlash from voters, but they impose fewer restrictions on profit-shifting to attract investment by multinational firms for economic growth. Data covering 19 advanced economies between 2006 and 2009 support my theoretical expectation. My analyses suggest that the effect of government partisanship on corporate tax policy can be ambiguous when political parties consider various policy tools.

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Although some studies show that women are more likely to oppose free trade than men, others demonstrate that economic globalization empowers women. Given this paradox, we examine whether gender shapes individual preferences with respect to foreign direct investment (FDI) in developing countries. We hypothesize that women do not disfavor FDI more than men because multinational corporations (MNCs) bring more jobs for women, provide better working conditions and higher wages than domestic firms, and spread norms and values that favor gender equality. Moreover, this gender gap will be wider in more globalized countries because women can observe such benefits of MNCs. To test our arguments, we used survey data from the 2007 Pew Global Attitudes Project. Overall, women view FDI more positively than men, and this effect is stronger in economically more globalized countries and countries that are less dependent on agriculture. Women have a different view on FDI than that on trade.

Recent regional trade agreements (RTAs) tend to link gender and trade issues through gender-related provisions. This pattern is mostly observed in RTAs formed between global North and South countries. Despite a growing interest in gender-related provisions among countries, there have not been systematic studies on the formation of RTAs with these instruments. Our study underscores women’s descriptive representation. Female representatives care more about advancing women’s interests and improving their status than their male counterparts. Thus, we posit that when women’s political representation in a country’s legislature is high, it is more likely to support gender-related provisions. Focusing on RTAs between the European Union and democratic developing countries from 1997 and 2016, we find some support that women’s presence in the legislature affects trade policy outcomes. Countries with higher female representation in the legislature tend to join RTAs with gender-related provisions, but these countries do not increase their commitment to gender equality by adding multiple provisions on gender.

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