No abstract

Recent regional trade agreements (RTAs) tend to link gender and trade issues through gender-related provisions. This pattern is mostly observed in RTAs formed between global North and South countries. Despite a growing interest in gender-related provisions among countries, there have not been systematic studies on the formation of RTAs with these instruments. Our study underscores women’s descriptive representation. Female representatives care more about advancing women’s interests and improving their status than their male counterparts. Thus, we posit that when women’s political representation in a country’s legislature is high, it is more likely to support gender-related provisions. Focusing on RTAs between the European Union and democratic developing countries from 1997 and 2016, we find some support that women’s presence in the legislature affects trade policy outcomes. Countries with higher female representation in the legislature tend to join RTAs with gender-related provisions, but these countries do not increase their commitment to gender equality by adding multiple provisions on gender.

Although developing countries have developed various kinds of diaspora engagement policies (DEPs) to court foreign direct investment (FDI) from diaspora, we do not know whether these policies matter for investment promotion. Do DEPs contribute to attracting diaspora FDI? Under what conditions might DEPs be most effective at attracting this FDI? DEPs facilitate diaspora FDI by lowering legal, informational, and psychological barriers that diasporas confront when investing in the homeland. These barriers include FDI restrictions, information scarcity, and a lack of meaningful, harmonious ties to the homeland. DEPs are more effective in autocracies where high investment barriers exist and are especially so when they lower informational and psychological investment obstacles. An analysis of diaspora‐weighted FDI from the United States to 25 Asian countries from 2002–2011 lends some support to these claims. While DEPs do not affect diaspora‐weighted FDI flows per se, their positive impact is observed in autocracies, and DEPs' lowering of psychological obstacles drives this conditional impact.

A consistent finding in the public opinion literature shows that individuals who attain higher levels of education are more likely to express pro-immigrant attitudes. The ideational hypothesis suggests that ideas learned during formal education drive this empirical relationship. In this article, we develop this hypothesis further by asking, "What types of ideas socialize pro-immigrant attitudes?" We argue that exposure to social theories during higher education promotes social inclusivity and tolerance, leading to positive views toward immigrants. This article draws theoretical insights from attitudinal-based theories of immigrant sentiment to construct a mediation model linking ideas from the classroom to attitudes toward immigrants. Using original data from a population-based survey in South Korea, we examine the relationship between respondents’ prior enrollment in different academic courses and their attitudes toward immigrants. We measure exposure to social theories as enrollment in social science and arts & humanities and find that only social science courses are positively associated with pro-immigrant attitudes. We also examine whether enrollment exhibits indirect effects via previously identified attitudinal determinants of immigrant sentiment. Results from our mediation analysis show that enrollment in social science courses is associated with stronger cosmopolitan views and negatively correlates with isolationist attitudes. In contrast, we find that enrollments in courses unrelated to social theories, like math & science and engineering, are not statistically significant predictors of immigrant attitudes. We interpret our results as observational evidence consistent with ideational-based explanations for pro-immigrant attitudes.

Governments in advanced industrial democracies generally regulate foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows with two types of policy measures: entry barriers and post-establishment restrictions. This article provides an integrated account for the two types of FDI restrictions, which is largely absent in the existing literature. We argue that the government's choice of FDI policies is shaped by a compound effect of the incumbent's ideological orientation and the political influence of unionized labour. Although inward FDI broadly benefits domestic workers, the entrance of multinational corporations (MNCs) adversely impacts the unionized interests of labour by transforming the labour market in ways detrimental to unions’ wage-bargaining leverage. Leftist governments, driven by the preferences of their labour constituency, tend to lift entry barriers to FDI in order to promote capital inflows. At the same time, leftist governments may also need to address unions’ concerns about inbound MNCs by tightening post-establishment restrictions on FDI, which impose constraints on the globalized business and operational model of MNCs. We argue that leftist incumbents generally liberalize entry barriers but tighten post-establishment restrictions when the level of labour unionization is high. We found evidence consistent with our argument from country-level and sector-level analysis of FDI restrictions, using a sample from the early 2000s to the mid-2010s of Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries.