The Electoral College has a measurable effect on the propensity of the rational voter to vote for the candidate he most prefers. The 'slippage' between the individual's articulated preference ordering and his actual vote is analyzed (using 1968 data) with respect to the strategic position of the voter in his state.The direction of the findings support the theoretically-derived propositions. Nevertheless, the low overall incidence of shifts and the reluctance of voters to shift from nationally-viable candidates demonstrates the overwhelming influence of the national electoral environment.Public Choice 34 (1979) 69-85. All rights reserved.As a result of the rules governing presidential elections, third-party campaigns are viable on a national scale providing that they satisfy certain conditions regarding their probable vote distribution within the individual states and the stability of their support vis-d-vis changes in the distribution of candidate preferences at the national level. In this paper, we will investigate third-party ~,ote-slippage' (dropoff in the percentage of the vote from the percentage of articulated pre-election preferences). This slippage will be analyzed with regard to the strategic position, within the electoral rules, in which third party supporters find themselves (within the various states). In addition, the argument will be extended to include a brief discussion of certain campaign techniques designed specifically to stabilize third-party prefences. These techniques will be connected to the structure, in a three-candidate race, of certain preference orderings which are inherently stable (not subject to slippage). Finally, drawing implications from the results and argument presented, we discuss whether or not some types of third party campaigns are encouraged more than others by the rules of the electoral college.Axiomatic to this model of voting decisions is an assumption that the individual voter is instrumentally rational. In a two-candidate contest the decision of the individual voter requires no information as to the viability of the preferred candidate. The rational voter casts his ballot for the most preferred candidate. However, the rational voter who has a strong-order preference ranking for all candidates in a three-candidate race faces a more complicated calculus. 3 He must attempt to assess the preferences and predict the behavior of other voters and he has an option other than straightforward or sincere translation of his first preference. 4 In a plurality election with three candidates it may be to his advantage to shift his vote to his second preference if the expected outcome of an election in which all vote sincerely is victory for his least-preferred candidate.The "best" strategy for partisans of the two front-running candidates is sincere voting. For voters with weak-order schedules (involving indifference between two or more candidates), those with top-tied (henceforth labelled R1) schedules should select the candidate in the strongest position to defeat their last prefe...

The Netherlands is one of the most densely populated countries in the world. Most of the country's land area is highly productive agricultural land. There is little or no area of natural ecosystem that could be called pristine, although high biodiversity values are certainly found. The Kingdom of the Netherlands also comprises six Caribbean islands with, among other things, tropical rainforests, mangrove forests and coral reefs. The main cause of the long-term decline biodiversity has been the intensification of agricultural production, including the reclamation of semi-natural areas, the drainage of wet areas, the use of artificial fertilizer, etc. But also unsustainable fishing, pollution, overgrazing, climate change and invasive alien species cause a decline in biodiversity. To reverse this decline, the Netherlands has prepared and implemented action plans and targets for biodiversity since 1990. This report presents the most important efforts to achieve the biodiversity targets.

Historians and social scientists have for years identified the current era as a new capital-dominant Gilded Age on the basis of economic trends (particularly rising inequality, now at a higher peak than in the early twentieth century), the coalescence of political elites (this time on a neoliberal, rather than protectionist agenda), and speculations about political upheaval on the horizon.

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