Roediger and McDermott (1995) induced false recall and false recognition for words that were not presented in lists. They had subjects study 24 lists of 15words that were associates of a common word (called the critical target or critical lure) that was not presented in the list. False recall and false recognition of the critical target occurred frequently in response to these lists. The purpose of the current work was to provide a set of normative data for the lists Roediger and McDermott used and for 12 others developed more recently. We tested false recall and false recognition for critical targets from 36 lists. Despite the fact that all lists were constructed to produce false remembering, the diversity in their effectiveness was large-6O% or more of subjects falsely recalled window and sleep following the appropriate lists, and false recognition for these items was greater than 800A>. However, the list generated from king led to 10% false recall and 27% false recognition. Possible reasons for these wide differences in effectiveness of the lists are discussed, These norms serve as a useful benchmark for designing experiments about false recall and false recognition in this paradigm. Roediger and McDermott (1995) designed experiments to study false recall and false recognition that were based on a technique first used by Deese (1959b). In a series of experiments in the late 1950s, Deese (1959aDeese ( , 1959b was interested in learning how associative factors affected recall. Deese (1959a) presented subjects with 15-word lists that varied in their interitem associative strength, "defined as the average relative frequency with which all items in a list tend to elicit all other items in the same list as free associates" (p. 305), He showed that this measure correlated highly (+.88) with the number of items recalled from the list but negatively with the number of extralist intrusions that subjects produced ( -.48). However, the stronger the associative bonds between list items, the more likely were subjects to produce the same common associate as an intrusion (+.55). In summary, lists ofwords that were strongly interassociated tended to produce accurate recall; when an intrusion did occur for these lists, it was likely to be highly similar among subjects.The authors are very grateful to Tim Capstick, Julianna Gooch, Shana Lesch, Rachel Stanovcic, Justin Warren, and Erica Woodard for completing the monumental task ofscoring these data and entering them into electronic format. We also thank David Payne, Don Read, and Gene Winograd for their comments on a previous draft of this paper. To examine their tendency to produce intrusions, Deese (1959b) presented 50 subjects with 12-word lists that varied in their interitem associative strength. For example, he presented subjects with the 12 most common associates to the word butterfly (moth, insect, wing, bird, fly, yellow, net, pretty,flower, bug, cocoon, color) and asked them to recall the list in any order (single trial, free recall). In this instance, not 1 subject...

Previous research has shown that implicit learning of a serial pattern in a reaction time task is eliminated or reduced when the task is performed concurrently with a tone-counting task. These results led to the inference that implicit learning requires attentional capacity. Two experiments tested the alternative hypothesis that the tone-counting task disrupts learning by preventing consistent organization of the sequence. The tone-counting condition was compared with a condition with additional attentional demands, but no disruption of organization, and with a condition with no additional attentional demands, but disruption of organization. The results were consistent with the organizational hypothesis. It is argued that learning depends on practicing consistently organized runs of trials, that shifts of attention may determine how the runs are organized, and that the relation between attention and learning depends more on organization and intention than on capacity.

Lewicki, Czyzewska, and Hoffman (1987) demonstrated learning without awareness in a visual search task. Rules determined target location on every seventh trial on the basis of target locations in the preceding six trials. Learning was demonstrated by negative transfer effects when the rules were changed. When questioned afterwards, the subjects could not describe the rules and denied awareness of them. This experiment was designed to replicate that of Lewicki et al. and to test several hypotheses about this apparent learning without awareness. Transfer conditions were included to determine whether rule learning was primarily perceptual or motor. The present assessment of awareness was based on an objective definition of awareness, rather than a subjective definition as in Lewicki et al.'s study. Their effect was replicated, and the transfer conditions revealed that learning relied on perceptual aspects of the task. The objective measure of awareness provided further evidence that subjects were unaware of the rules.

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