The current policy for improving health care in prisons is not likely to achieve its objectives and is potentially wasteful. The prison service needs to recognise that expertise in the commissioning and delivery of health care is overwhelming based in the NHS. The current review of the provision of health care in prisons offers an opportunity to ensure that prisoners are not excluded from high quality health care.

High transaction costs are detrimental to the efficient operation or existence of markets for inputs and outputs. The cost of information and the costs associated with the search for trade partners, the distance to formal markets and contract enforcement are likely to influence the marketing of food crops. This study hypothesises that the level of income generated from food-crop sales by small-scale farmers in the Impendle and Swayimana districts of KwaZuluNatal is influenced by transaction costs and certain household and farm characteristics. Regression analysis shows that the depth of marketing methods is significantly influenced by transaction cost proxies, such as cooperation with large commercial farmers and ownership of means of transport. Results from a block-recursive regression analysis show that the level of crop income generated is determined by the depth of marketing methods, the size of allocated arable land and off-farm income. Households with lower transaction costs, sizeable allocated land and off-farm income can be expected to generate higher income from food crops. Investment in public goods such as roads, telecommunications and an efficient legal system (to uphold commercial contracts), as well as farmer support services (input supply, extension, marketing information and research), would probably raise farm and non-farm income by reducing transaction costs. This would increase the effective demand for locally produced goods and services, thus contributing to rural employment and livelihoods within rural communal areas.

Purpose -The purpose of this paper is to identify factors that constrain marketing choices available to smallholders, limiting the chain's robustness from their perspective. Design/methodology/approach -This paper draws on transaction cost economics to develop a model explaining dyadic relationships between smallholders and their buyers. The model was used to analyse a case study of the supply chain for organic fresh vegetables in Kathmandu, Nepal. Findings -This chain is characterised mainly by relational contracting between smallholders and their buyers. There was also evidence of vertical integration by some buyers, and of growers selling on informal markets. However, there was no evidence of spot market trading or of conventional contracting. These outcomes were attributed primarily to the absence effective standards and legal systems. Despite this, the chain offered smallholders a range of dyads with different risk-reward trade-offs. Research limitations/implications -This paper is based on the findings of a case study. While the results can be generalised to theory, they cannot be generalised to other supply chains. Originality/value -This study considers supply-chain performance from the perspective of smallholders. The model proposed for the study extends the traditional vertical coordination continuum to incorporate missing dyads and informal markets.

This paper evaluates the impact of institutional and governance factors on the performance of 10 smallholder agricultural cooperatives in KwaZulu-Natal (KZN). Five of the cooperatives grow and market vegetables, three produce and market poultry, one is a beef production cooperative and another operates a bakery. The results of a cluster analysis suggest that the performance of the selected smallholder cooperatives is influenced by institutional and governance problems. Institutional problems give rise to low levels of equity and debt capital, reliance on government funding, low levels of investment, and subsequent loss of members. Governance problems are strongly linked to the absence of secret ballot, low levels of education, lack of production and management skills training, weak marketing arrangements and consequent low returns to members as patrons or investors. The conclusion is that appropriate institutional arrangements and good governance are important to the performance of enterprises initiated by groups of smallholders. South Africa's new Cooperatives Act prevents smallholder cooperatives from adopting good institutional arrangements. Alternative ownership structures such as close corporations and private companies offer better institutional arrangements and opportunities for equitysharing partnerships.