PurposeTo examine the enabling legislation of European Union (EU) member country supreme audit institutions (SAIs) for their accountability to parliament and independence from the executive arm of government.Design/methodology/approachThe sample comprises the SAIs of the 25 EU member countries and the European Court of Auditors. Data were collected on 30 accountability and independence issues directly from the enabling legislation of these SAIs.FindingsResults indicate that apart from a number of instances where the enabling legislation is silent, provisions generally provide for adequate independence of the SAIs from the executive arm of government. On the other hand, the provisions for the accountability of the SAIs to parliament are somewhat weaker.Research limitations/implicationsIf actual practice or convention does not reflect the literal interpretation and application of the enabling legislation, then SAIs may have more or less independence and/or accountability than suggested by the analysis of the legislation alone.Practical implicationsResults of this study highlight where current provisions could be further strengthened through appropriate amendments to the enabling legislation.Originality/valueSuch findings may be useful to policy makers and legislators.

In reviewing contemporary literature on materiality judgement and the audit expectations gap (AEG), this paper considers an apparent void concerning that aspect of the AEG caused by the non‐disclosure of materiality and risk thresholds and criteria in the financial reports. The review enables the formation and discussion of two premises: first, disclosing cornerstone concepts, such as materiality and risk judgements, in financial reports enhances users' understanding of the limitations of information contained therein; and second, expanding the wording in audit reports reduces the AEG and enhances users' understanding of the objectives and limitations of an audit. In supporting the validity of these premises, it is concluded that the disclosure of materiality and risk judgements in financial reports may reduce the AEG. This hypothesis may be useful for future empirical research.

This study reports results on a comparison of the enabling legislation of all nine auditorsgeneral of Australia from a public sector accountability and auditor independence perspective.

This study adds to the literature on the audit expectations gap (AEG) by examining the extent to which lower levels of user cognisance of the role, objectives, and limitations of an audit are associated with unreasonable audit expectations and perceptions. Cognisance is proxied by respondents' demographic characteristics including profession, work experience, university qualification, age, and gender. Respondents include 130 Singaporean auditors, prepares, and users of audited financial reports. Results indicate that the AEG prevails where respondents have relatively little business work experience, and no university qualifications. This supports the premise that lower levels of cognisance of the audit function are associated with the AEG The study also argues that in obtaining results consistent with prior AEG studies set in other countries, the AEG is not affected or constrained by political, legal, social, or economic factors. The study recommends that the accounting professions continue to address the AEG by further educating the public on the role and limitations of an audit, extending the auditor's current responsibilities to match users' expectations, and ensuring the existence and monitoring of audit quality.

Supreme audit institutions, such as the auditors‐general, are considered a crucial link in the accountability chain between parliament and the executive arm of government. The purpose of this study is to examine the enabling legislation of the supreme audit institutions of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) member countries from a public sector accountability and independence perspective. Following on from INTOSAI (1998), English and Guthrie (2000) and De Martinis and Clark (2001), this study uses an accountability and independence framework to identify and compare the current legislation applicable to the supreme audit institutions of the ASEAN member countries with regard to independence, autonomy, mandate, funding issues, and related parliamentary powers. This study finds that while on average each jurisdiction has addressed slightly less than half the total number of issues under examination, there is considerable diversity with regard to the particular issues addressed. The study suggests policy implications to further strengthen the provisions for accountability and independence of supreme audit institutions through amendments to the enabling legislation of the various jurisdictions.