Scholars have long suspected that political processes such as democracy and corruption are important factors in determining economic growth. Studies show, however, that democracy has only indirect effects on growth, while corruption is generally accepted by scholars as having a direct and negative impact on economic performance. We argue that one of democracy's indirect benefits is its ability to mitigate the detrimental effect of corruption on economic growth. Although corruption certainly occurs in democracies, the electoral mechanism inhibits politicians from engaging in corrupt acts that damage overall economic performance and thereby jeopardize their political survival. Using time-series cross-section data for more than 100 countries from 1982–97, we show that corruption has no significant effect on economic growth in democracies, while non-democracies suffer significant economic harm from corruption.

Objective. Beginning with the 1993 election, Canada's Progressive Conservative Party was replaced as the dominant force on the political right by the more ideological Reform Party/Canadian Alliance. This article examines what specific issues most centrally motivated this seismic shift among conservative Canadians. Method. Using data from the 1993, 1997, and 2000 Canadian Election Studies, we employ bivariate analyses and multinomial logit voting models to determine whether constitutional, economic, nativist, or moral issues most clearly differentiate PC supporters from R/A voters. Results. Regional concerns are important and other issues have sporadic impacts, but moral traditionalism is the most consistent and powerful factor distinguishing supporters of the new party from supporters of the old one. Conclusions. Although existing studies have focused primarily on other sources of R/A support, moral traditionalism is clearly a key factor in explaining the party's ascendancy. This phenomenon, we contend, is part of a larger trend toward postmaterial politics in Western democracies.

Abstract. The primary lesson to be learned from the failed Charlottetown Accord is that substantive constitutional reform in Canada is not possible, and will not be for some time. This claim is structurally grounded—a reflection of inherent limitations to successful constitutional negotiations. Specifically, it contends that the requirement of mass input/legitimization of constitutional bargaining in deeply divided societies is incompatible with successful constitution making. There are two reasons for this conclusion. First, mass legitimization serves to undermine effective elite accommodation. The degree of compromise necessary to forge a constitutional agreement at the elite level among different societal groups alienates too many mass supporters of each group. As a result, elites cannot deliver the support of their constitutional constituents. Second, constitution making, by virtue of providing certain groups with almost perpetual special privileges, provides an incentive for groups to seek constitutional status. Mass input into the constitutional process lowers the costs associated with seeking constitutional status, thereby facilitating the creation of new constitutional orientations. In this article, a theoretical argument about the incompatibility of consociational constitutionalism and mass input/legitimization is developed. This argument applies to the Canadian context, detailing the prevailing “mega-constitutional” orientations (MCOs) in Canada, emphasizing their inherent irreconcilability. Based on evidence from the Charlottetown referendum campaign, empirical support is provided for the argument developed. Finally, the conclusion summarizes the findings and forecasts failure for constitutional initiatives, in Canada and elsewhere, where consociational constitutionalism occurs in tandem with the requirement of mass input/legitimization.Résumé. La première leçon à tirer de l'échec de l'Accord de Charlottetown, c'est qu'une réforme constitutionnelle en profondeur n'est pas possible, et ce pour un avenir prévisible. Cette prémisse s'appuie sur des éléments structured, reflétant des limites inhérentes aux négotiations constitutionnelles. Plus précisément, cela présume que l'exigence de légitimation par les masses du marchandage constitutionnel dans des sociétés profondément divisées représente un obstacle majeur pour le succès des négotiations. On invoquera deux motifs pour justifier cette conclusion. D'abord, la légitimation populaire contribue à empêcher les accommodements entre les élites. L'ampleur des compromis nécessaires à l'émergence d'un accord au niveau des élites entre différents groupes sociaux aliène trop de citoyens dans chacun des groupes. Conséquemment, les élites ne peuvent garantir l'appui de leurs mandants. En deuxième lieu, le bricolage constitutionnel, qui procure à certains groupes des privilèges sociaux perpétuels, encourage les groupes à rechercher un statut constitutionnel. La participation des masses au processus diminue les coûts associés à la quête de statut constitutionnel, facilitant ainsi la création de nouvelles orientations constitutionnelles. Cet article propose une argumentation théorique à propos de l'incompatibilité entre le constitutionnalisme consociationnel et la légitimation par la participation populaire. La thèse est appliquée au cas canadien, approfondissant les orientations macro-constitutionnelles dominantes ou pas, et en en faisant ressortir l'irréconciliabilité. En s'appuyant sur l'expérience référendaire d'octobre 1992, l'article étoffe ensuite concrètement l'argumentation. Par-delà le résumé des principaux résultats, la conclusion prédit l'àchec des initiatives constitutionnelles, au Canada et ailleurs, partout où le constitutionnalisme consociationnel sera accompagné par l'exigence d'une légitimation par la participation populaire.

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Many traditional vote choice studies have focused on the so-called gender gap, which refers to the persistent difference in partisan preferences between men and women~see, among others, Abzug and Kelber, 1984;Conover, 1988;Mueller, 1991; Chaney, Alvarez and Nagler, 1998!. A less examined phenomenon, but one of perhaps equal consequence, at least for parties of the political right who seek to satisfy core constituencies, concerns what has been called the 'marriage gap.' Since it was first identified by Plissner~1983! in the context of American presidential elections, a small literature has emerged documenting the relationship between marital status and support for conservative parties and candidates in the United States. Perhaps understandably, given the relative paucity of literature even in the American case, there have been no published studies considering the impact of marriage on political attitudes and vote choice in other industrial democracies.As discussed below, hypotheses that seek to explain the marriage gap typically focus on two explanatory clusters: socio-demographic and attitudinal. We suspect that both are relevant, but that more nuance can be introduced into the broad dichotomy that characterizes the small extant literature. There is some evidence that the marriage gap is a product of antecedent socio-demographic factors. Flowing from this, there is controversy as to whether these socio-demographic factors generate attitudinal differences, or whether attitudinal differences are part of the general conservatism produced by family life. Herbert F. Weisberg~1987!, for example, suggests that the marriage gap is merely an artifact of demographics. marriage gap in the United States is explained through two sociodemographic variables: race and income. Simply put, married people are most likely to be white and well off, and thus to vote Republican. Similarly, Eric Plissner~1983, 53! speculates that "married people are more likely to own property and to worry about protecting it . . . ." Hence, they are expected to be more likely to vote for parties of the right and centreright, traditionally more friendly to the property-owning classes.Paul William Kingston and Steven E. Finkel's~1987! examination of the 1984 presidential election, however, finds that the interaction of marriage and home ownership has no impact apart from the additive effects of either component variable. Put differently, mortgage payments apparently do not drive the marriage gap. Instead, their multivariate analysis indicates that the marriage gap is driven by attitudinal factors that may not be grounded in socio-demographics. Married people self-identified as slightly more conservative than either singles or those who had been previously married. Similarly, they took slightly more conservative positions on selected policies-government aid to minorities, government responsibility for job creation and living standards, civil rights enforcement and individual responsibility. The differences were statistically significant, but slight. Inde...