We study a class of single-round, sealed-bid auctions for an item in unlimited supply, such as a digital good. We introduce the notion of competitive auctions. A competitive auction is truthful (i.e. encourages bidders to bid their true valuations) and on all inputs yields profit that is within a constant factor of the profit of the optimal single sale price. We justify the use of optimal single price profit as a benchmark for evaluating a competitive auctions profit. We exhibit several randomized competitive auctions and show that there is no symmetric deterministic competitive auction. Our results extend to bounded supply markets, for which we also give competitive auctions.
In the classical consensus problem, each of n processors receives a private input value and produces a decision value which is one of the original input values, with the requirement that all processors decide the same value. A central result in distributed computing is that, in several standard models including the asynchronous shared-memory model, this problem has no deterministic solution. The k-set agreement problem is a generalization of the classical consensus proposed by Chaudhuri [Inform. and Comput., 105 (1993), pp. 132-158], where the agreement condition is weakened so that the decision values produced may be different, as long as the number of distinct values is at most k. For n > k ≥ 2 it was not known whether this problem is solvable deterministically in the asynchronous shared memory model. In this paper, we resolve this question by showing that for any k < n, there is no deterministic wait-free protocol for n processors that solves the k-set agreement problem. The proof technique is new: it is based on the development of a topological structure on the set of possible processor schedules of a protocol. This topological structure has a natural interpretation in terms of the knowledge of the processors of the state of the system. This structure reveals a close analogy between the impossibility of wait-free k-set agreement and the Brouwer fixed point theorem for the k-dimensional ball.
In practice, almost all dynamic systems require decisions to be made on-line, without full knowledge of their future impact on the system. A general model for the processing of sequences of tasks is introduced, and a general on-line decision algorithm is developed. It is shown that, for an important class of special cases, this algorithm is optimal among all on-line algorithms. Specifically, a task system ( S,d ) for processing sequences of tasks consists of a set S of states and a cost matrix d where d ( i, j is the cost of changing from state i to state j (we assume that d satisfies the triangle inequality and all diagonal entries are 0). The cost of processing a given task depends on the state of the system. A schedule for a sequence T 1 , T 2 ,…, T k of tasks is a sequence s 1 , s 2 ,…, s k of states where s i is the state in which T i is processed; the cost of a schedule is the sum of all task processing costs and the state transition costs incurred. An on-line scheduling algorithm is one that chooses s i only knowing T 1 T 2 … T i . Such an algorithm is w -competitive if, on any input task sequence, its cost is within an additive constant of w times the optimal offline schedule cost. The competitive ratio w ( S , d ) is the infimum w for which there is a w -competitive on-line scheduling algorithm for ( S , d ). It is shown that w ( S , d ) = 2|S|–1 for every task system in which d is symmetric, and w ( S, d ) = O (| S | 2 ) for every task system. Finally, randomized on-line scheduling algorithms are introduced. It is shown that for the uniform task system (in which d ( i,j ) = 1 for all i,j ), the expected competitive ratio w¯ ( S,d ) = O (log|S|).
Dynamic data stNcture problems involve the representation of data in memory in such a way as to permit certain types of modifications of the data (updates) and certain types of questions about the data (queries).This paradigm encompasses many fimdamental problems in computer science.
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