Recently there have been several attempts in formal epistemology to develop an adequate probabilistic measure of coherence. There is much to recommend probabilistic measures of coherence. They are quantitative and render formally precise a notion coherencenotorious for its elusiveness. Further, some of them do very well, intuitively, on a variety of test cases. Siebel, however, argues that there can be no adequate probabilistic measure of coherence. Take some set of propositions 𝑨, some probabilistic measure of coherence, and a probability distribution such that all the probabilities on which 𝑨's degree of coherence depends (according to the measure in question) are defined. Then, the argument goes, the degree to which 𝑨 is coherent depends solely on the details of the distribution in question and not at all on the explanatory relations, if any, standing between the propositions in 𝑨. This is problematic, the argument continues, because, first, explanation matters for coherence, and, second, explanation cannot be adequately captured solely in terms of probability. We argue that Siebel's argument falls short.Recently there have been several attempts in formal epistemology to develop an adequate probabilistic measure of coherence. 1 The basic idea behind this approach is that the degree to which a set of propositions 𝑨 is coherentthe degree to which the propositions in 𝑨 "mutually support each other" or "hang together"is a function of various probabilities involving the propositions in 𝑨. A brief illustration is in order. Suppose 𝑨 consists of propositions A 1 and A 2 , and take some probabilistic confirmation measure c. 2 Then, on 1 See e.g. Douven and Meijs (2007), Fitelson (2003), Meijs (2006), Olsson (2002), Roche (2013), Schupbach (2011), and Shogenji (1999. 2 For discussion of, and references regarding, the main probabilistic confirmation measures in the literature, see Crupi et al. (2007), Eells and Fitelson (2002), and Festa (1999.
