There are many variables of territoriality available to national courts under contemporary international law. Does the same apply to the International Criminal Court? And if so, what are the limits to the teleological expansion of the Court's territorial jurisdiction as regards, for example, partial commission of a crime in State not Party territory, crimes committed over the internet or crimes committed in occupied territories? Michael Vagias's analysis of the law and procedure surrounding the territorial jurisdiction of the Court examines issues such as the application of localisation theories of territoriality and the means of interpretation for article 12(2)(a); the principle of legality (nullum crimen sine lege) and human rights law for the interpretation of jurisdictional provisions; compétence de la compétence; crimes committed over the internet; and the procedure for jurisdictional objections.

On 9 April 2018, the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court filed a request seeking the composition of a Pre-Trial Chamber, in order to decide whether the Court has territorial jurisdiction over the Rohingya deportation from Myanmar to Bangladesh as a crime against humanity. This filing is a first for the Court on at least two fronts; it is the first time the Prosecutor has asked the Court to interpret Article 12(2)(a) and apply qualified territoriality; it is also the first time the Prosecutor has asked for a ruling on jurisdiction under Article 19(3).This study explores certain procedural questions emerging from this request, such as the Court’s authority to decide while its jurisdiction is ‘dormant’; the function of Article 19(3) within the Rome Statute’s overall system concerning jurisdictional determinations; issuing a decision on jurisdiction, while avoiding prejudice to subsequent proceedings and without rendering meaningless the right to challenge jurisdiction under Article 19(2) of the Statute. The article accepts that the request is a step in the right direction, as it signals the Prosecutor’s determination to investigate the Rohingya crisis. However, the manner and timing of its presentation give rise to plausible claims of incompatibility with the Court’s procedural framework. Arguably, the Court may well instruct the Prosecutor to assume the risk of wasting precious resources and proceed with further investigations, pending the final determination of the jurisdictional question at a later stage.

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The article explores the extent to which the resilience of hybrid courts is impacted by their selection of cases. It proceeds from the observation that the cases pursued by hybrid institutions are the result of choice under constraints. The article examines the identity of the case-choosers and the relevance of such choices for the internal and external resilience of hybrid courts. The research reveals the need to distinguish between case selection by the drafters and case selection by court authorities in the context of each institution and the tensions between these two sets of practices. These tensions are examined in the context of four hybrid institutions. The Office of the Prosecutor at the Special Court for Sierra Leone enjoyed a relatively broad measure of discretion in terms of case selection. However, the Extraordinary African Chambers, the Cambodia Chambers and the Kosovo Specialist Chambers seem to have been established with specific accused in mind. The article argues that resilience considerations are probably relevant in instances of case selection by the court officers, albeit they are context sensitive and may vary over time. Case selection prior to the establishment of a court and/or by political stakeholders, on the other hand, is ill-suited for analysis using internal resilience and arguably fall outside its scope of application. For these cases, the research argues that the discussion requires re-orientation with emphasis shifted to concepts such as contribution to national reconciliation as opposed to resistance to external pressure.