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This study used an ultimatum game to test the hypothesis that older individuals make more selfish offers when bargaining for highly attractive rewards, regardless of the impacts of others' responses on reward size. Both older and younger individuals separately participated in the experiment and made offers as allocators. The effects of four factors (age, certainty of the allocators' own reward depending on the recipient's response, the recipient's response, and type of rewards to be shared) on participants' offers and expectations of recipients' replies were observed. Older participants demanded higher shares for themselves than younger participants, even under the low certainty condition in the highly attractive reward scenario. Particularly in this scenario, older participants increased their portions immediately after receiving rejections. Moreover, they consistently expected the recipients to accept their offers regardless of the proposed distribution amount or bargaining conditions. It was implied that the high attractiveness of the rewards made it difficult for older individuals to predict the recipient's view of their proposals and thus contributed to them making selfish proposals.

This paper analyzes human errors, which caused Blow Out accident in China in 2003 by incorporating organizational conditions. Empirical studies show that organizational factors play an important role in creating contexts for human errors. The analyzing procedure outlined in the paper is a combination of three techniques, m-SHELL, FTA and 4E-4M, used for performing HRA in the context of PSA. It includes a process of quantifying the criticality of the organizational influence factors. Finally, with these criticality indexes, the most vulnerable parts in the well drilling system are indicated, and possible and practicable countermeasures are suggested.