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This article examines the background and the framework of discussions about the concept of sovereignty and its limits. It begins with a short historical analysis of the processes which took place in Soviet Russia leading to the 'parade of sovereignties' in the early 1990s. Afterwards, the author sketches the different approaches and doctrines upheld by the Russian Constitutional Court in several landmark decisions concerning sovereignty problems. The article focuses on the vertical dimension of sovereignty, i.e., on different conceptions adopted by federal and regional powers in post-Soviet Russia regarding the legal status of the member-republics (subjects) of the Russian Federation. The development of the doctrine of the Constitutional Court of Russia in this matter is quite illustrative as to the legal arguments used to protect the integrity of the Russian Federation against the diverse disintegrative strategies pursued by the regions.

This article examines the correlation between the concepts of sovereignty, human rights, and democracy in Russian legal and political debate, analyzing this correlation in the context of Russian philosophical discourse. It argues that sovereignty often is used as a powerful argument which allows the setting aside of international humanitarian standards and the formal constitutional guarantees of human rights. This conflict between sovereignty and human rights also recurs in other countries, and many legal scholars are demanding the revision or even abandonment of the concept of sovereignty. In Russia, this conflict is aggravated by some characteristic features of the traditional mentality frequently favoring statism and collective interests over individual ones, and by the state building a ‘power vertical’ subordinating regional and other particularistic interests to the central power. These features and policies are studied in the context of the Slavophile-Westernizer philosophical divide. This divide reveals the pros and contras put forward by the Russian supporters of the isolationist (conservative) policy throughout contemporary history—especially in the sovereignty debates in recent years. The 1993 Russian Constitution contains many declaratory statements about human rights and democracy, but their formulations are vague and, thus far, have had little concrete effect in court battles where the application of international humanitarian law from time to time has been counterbalanced by the concerns of the protection of sovereignty. These concerns coincide with isolationist and authoritarian policies, which in 2006 led to their amalgamation in the concept of ‘sovereign democracy’. This concept is considered in this article to be a recurrence of the Russian conservative tradition. Even though the concept in its literal meaning has been abandoned by its author and supporters, most of its ideas remain on the cusp of the official political discourse which reproduces the pivotal axes of Russian political philosophy of the XIX century.

In this paper the author questions the role of Eugen Ehrlich's sociological jurisprudence for contemporary debates regarding the sources of binding rules that have their (ontological) foundation in societal practices, but whose validity cannot be extracted from these practices. The question on the normativity of legal rules for Ehrlich was not identical with the thesis on the normativity of social practices and the patterns of behavior that are capable of having a biding force if fixed in a legally recognized form (i.e., recognized by the legal community). As a result, the process of norm-creation requires an intellectual reconstruction of these practices and patterns by jurists, judges, and legislators who reshape societal relations into legal ones with the help of particular intellectual images. It is this reshaping that gives rise to legal rules. The process of such reconstruction cannot be anything but intellectual, and therefore cannot be conceived of without reference to the creative work of lawyers. Consequently, legal rules cannot emerge directly from societal practices. The practices in which the lawyers are engaged or which they simply contemplate, can influence their creative activity, but cannot replace it, and thus cannot provide a mechanical transformation of the factual into the intellectual or normative.JEL Classification: K1.