It is known that psychological effects by suggestion, autosuggestion, context change, etc., can positively influence the individual's psychological mood and health. However, the mechanisms of this impact have not been studied so far. The problem is that a psychological impact must be perceived, but a consciousness which perceives information is not able to influence the physiological processes directly. The aim of the study was to show that a psychological impact is possible by means of the mechanisms of cognitive control which automatically checks the correctness of the execution of the tasks assigned to the consciousness (or commands given to the consciousness) and the correctness of realizing concrete operations necessary for solving a task, and to confirm experimentally the existence of such involuntary cognitive control. Materials and Methods. The present experimental investigation was based on the modified interference task, "Picture-Picture" test, in which images of two objects are simultaneously presented to the participants, and they should identify one target image, ignoring the second. Seventy-five people aged 18-29 years (75% of women) participated in the confirmatory study. The tested subjects were to identify the object in the picture. The stimulus material also featured some irrelevant characteristics: a solid or dotted frame in which the target object was depicted. Results. The data of the experiment have shown that regardless of the stimulus presentation order the task in the dotted frame are fulfilled longer than in the solid one (p<0.001). However, in the post-experimental interview, the subjects said that the frame had not influenced their work in any way and they had not paid any attention to it. Thus, the results obtained show that the irrelevant parameters of the object (a frame in our case) are an essential part of defining the context in which the problem is being solved. Depending on this context the processes of cognitive control verify the execution of various tasks changing the time of the response. Conclusion. It has been established that there exist cognitive control mechanisms that verify which task is being solved by a person. It has also been shown that the initiation of such verification automatically leads to susceptibility to psychological impact and physiological changes. At the same time, this control is noted to be triggered after the task (or command) has been apperceived.

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Рассматриваются возможные интерпретации природы эффекта Струпа. Предполагается, что Струп-интерференция возникает в результате работы сознательного контроля над выполнением задачи игнорирования. Экспериментально проверяется (N = 90) гипотеза о том, что интерференция возникает в том случае, когда у испытуемых есть возможность сделать ошибку, т. е. дать ответ, соответствующий игнорируемому параметру Струп-стимула. Результаты показали, что, если такой возможности нет, уровень интерференции снижается как следствие уменьшения контроля задачи над игнорируемым заданием. Библиогр. 39 назв. Ил. 2. Табл. 2. Ключевые слова: интерференция, эффект набора ответов, контроль задачи, интерференционная ошибка, эффект Струпа.

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The most common ways researchers explain the Stroop effect are either through semantic or through response conflict. According to the literature, there are several methods capable of disentangling these conflicts: to use words outside of the response set, to use associatively related colors and words, or to use a “2:1” paradigm (requiring the same response for two types of stimuli). However, we believe that these methods cannot entirely differentiate semantic and response conflicts. We propose the following alternative method: when naming the color of a printed word (e.g., red, yellow, etc.) in the Stroop test, participants were asked to use different color names for some colors. For example, the red-colored stimuli had to be named by the word “yellow”. This approach allowed us to create semantically congruent stimuli, but with the conflict at the response level (the word red appears in red, but the participants have to say “yellow” because of the rule). Some stimuli remain congruent at the response level, but with the conflict at the semantic level (the word yellow appears in red, and the participants have to say “yellow” because of the rule). The results showed that semantically congruent stimuli do not produce the Stroop effect even if the meaning of the word corresponds to an incorrect response. In turn, congruence at the response level reduces the interference effect, but interference remains significant. Thus, the response conflict affects the magnitude of the Stroop effect only when there is a semantic conflict. Our data do not correspond to models that assume direct activation of responses corresponding to word meaning