In early 2020, President Jair Bolsonaro had completed his first year of office. His election, in October 2018, marked a rightward political shift after 14 years of government by the left-wing Workers' Party (PT). The PT had been in power since 2003 with Lula da Silva for two terms and then Dilma Rousseff elected in 2010 and reelected in 2014. In 2016, amidst corruption scandals, the Brazilian Senate impeached Rousseff for moving funds between government budgets. Rousseff denied having done anything illegal and argued that this was a common practice amongst her predecessors. 1 At the time of his election, Bolsonaro had been in permanent campaign for at least three years ( Joathan & Rebouças, 2020), presenting himself as an anti-PT candidate and advocate of Christian values. Although he had worked as a federal legislator since 1991, he was also portrayed as being anti-establishment. Gaining strength due to Brazil's political turmoil, Bolsonaro, a former army captain, managed to gather support from inf luential actors, such as the military, the Evangelical churches, the economic elites, and politicians aligned with a neoliberal agenda. He beat the PT candidate Fernando Haddad in the second round of the elections with 55.1% of valid votes.The PT's original plan was to name Lula as a presidential candidate, but the Superior Electoral Court disqualified him under Brazil's Clean Slate Law. Ironically, three days after winning the election, Bolsonaro appointed Sergio Moro, the judge who helped arrest Lula for corruption charges, to his Justice Ministry. Since then, the president remains true to his confrontational style. In this context of ideological disputes, Brazil confirmed its first case of COVID-19 in February 2020. This chapter draws from quantitative and qualitative content analyses to address issues of governance and rhetoric during the coronavirus crises.Brazil 221
ChronologyTable 19.1 presents a summary of the dissemination of COVID-19 in Brazil and the main measures taken by the federal government between February and August 2020.
AnalysisThis chapter draws from quantitative and qualitative content analyses of posts published on the Facebook pages of Brazil's Federal Government (@palaciodoplanalto) (n = 237) and Favela do Alemão's Crisis Committee page (@gabinetealemao) (n = 52). For both, we have collected posts published between February 26 and June 25. We chose Facebook because Brazilian users account to 120 million people (second only to YouTube in popularity). 2 The Planalto page represents the government's official voice, allowing citizens to follow government-led actions, projects and the president's everyday life. The @gabinetealemao page was created to report the activities of the Crisis Committee, which had been established in March by three collectives from Favela do Alemão: Coletivo Papo Reto, Voz das Comunidades and Mulheres em Ação no Alemão. We also draw from inside information from Thainã de Medeiros, one of the founders of Coletivo Papo Reto.The Crisis Committee tapped into the collectives...
