SUMMARYCurrent signature-based antivirus solutions have three limitations such as the large volume of signature database, privacy preservation, and computation overheads of signature matching. In this paper, we propose LigeroAV, a light-weight, performance-enhanced antivirus, suitable for pervasive environments such as mobile phones. LigeroAV focuses on detecting MD5 signatures which are more than 90% of signatures. LigeroAV offloads matching computation in the cloud server with up-todated signature database while preserving privacy level using the Bloom filter.

An antivirus is a widely used solution for detecting malicious softwares in client devices.The performance of antivirus solutions in the mobile client environment is critical due to its resource constrains. Many solutions light-weighting client's overhead in the mobile client environment have been developed. However, most solutions require platform modifications or software installations and it decreases their realizations in practice. In this paper, we propose a solution detecting malwares on networks using the Software Defined Network (SDN). Our main goal is designing a solution detecting malwares of mobile client without involving the client into the work. We contribute to provide a solution that does not require client-side installations or modifications and so is easily applicable in practice.

Android provides a message-passing mechanism called intent. While it helps easy developments of communications between intra and inter applications, it can be vulnerable to attacks. In particular, implicit intent, differing from explicit intent specifying a receiving component, does not specify a component that receives a message and insecure ways of using implicit intents may allow malicious applications to intercept or forge intents. In this paper, we focus on security vulnerabilities of implicit intent and review researched attacks and solutions. For the case of implicit intent using `developer-created action', specific attacks and solutions have been published. However, for the case of implicit intent using `Android standard action', no specific attack has been found and less studied. In this paper, we present a new attack on implicit intent using Android standard action and propose solutions to protect smart phones from this attack.

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